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Abstract—Side channel attacks have been used to extract
critical data such as encryption keys and confidential user data
in a variety of adversarial settings. In practice, this threat
is addressed by adhering to a constant-time programming
discipline, which imposes strict constraints on the way in which
programs are written. This introduces an additional hurdle for
programmers faced with the already difficult task of writing
secure code, highlighting the need for solutions that give the
same source-level guarantees while supporting more natural
programming models.
We propose a novel type system for verifying that pro-
grams correctly implement constant-resource behavior. Our
type system extends recent work on automatic amortized re-
source analysis (AARA), a set of techniques that automatically
derive provable upper bounds on the resource consumption of
programs. We devise new techniques that build on the potential
method to achieve compositionality, precision, and automation.
A strict global requirement that a program always maintains
constant resource usage is too restrictive for most practical
applications. It is sufficient to require that the program’s
resource behavior remain constant with respect to an attacker
who is only allowed to observe part of the program’s state
and behavior. To account for this, our type system incorporates
information flow tracking into its resource analysis. This allows
our system to certify programs that need to violate the constant-
time requirement in certain cases, as long as doing so does
not leak confidential information to attackers. We formalize
this guarantee by defining a new notion of resource-aware
noninterference, and prove that our system enforces it.
Finally, we show how our type inference algorithm can be
used to synthesize a constant-time implementation from one
that cannot be verified as secure, effectively repairing insecure
programs automatically. We also show how a second novel
AARA system that computes lower bounds on resource usage
can be used to derive quantitative bounds on the amount of
information that a program leaks through its resource use.
We implemented each of these systems in Resource Aware
ML, and show that it can be applied to verify constant-time
behavior in a number of applications including encryption
and decryption routines, database queries, and other resource-
aware functionality.
Keywords-Language-based security; timing channels; infor-
mation flow; resource analysis; static analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks extract sensitive information about a
program’s state through its observable use of resources such
as time, network, and memory. These attacks pose a realistic
threat to the security of systems in a range of settings, in
which the attacker has local access to the native host [1],
through multi-tenant virtualized environments [2], [3], or
remotely over the network [4]. Side channels have revealed
highly-sensitive data such as cryptographic keys [1], [4], [5],
[6], [7] and private user data [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
These attacks are mounted by taking repeated measure-
ments of a program’s resource behavior, and comparing
the resulting observations against a model that relates the
program’s secret state to its resource usage. Unlike direct
information flow channels that operate over the input/output
semantics of a program, the conditions that give rise to
side channels are oftentimes subtle and therefore difficult
for programmers to identify and mitigate. This also poses a
challenge for automated tool support aimed at addressing
such problems—whereas direct information flow can be
described in terms of standard program semantics, a similar
precise treatment of side channels requires incorporating
the corresponding resource into the semantics and applying
quantitative reasoning.
This difficulty has led previous work in the area to treat
resource use indirectly, by reasoning about the flow of secret
information into branching control flow or other operations
that might affect resource use [13], [14], [15], [16]. These
approaches can limit the expressiveness of secure programs
and further complicate the development. For example, by
requiring programmers to write code using a “constant-time
discipline” that forbids the use of variables influenced by
secret state in statements that could affect the program’s
control path [13].
Verifiable constant-resource language: In this paper,
we present a novel type system that gives developers the
ability to certify that their code is secure against resource
side-channel attacks w.r.t. a high-level attack model, in
which the resource consumption of each language construct
is modeled by a constant. Our approach reduces constraints
on the expressiveness of programs that can be verified, and
does not introduce general stylistic guidelines that must
be followed in order to ensure constant-resource behavior.
Programmers write code in typical functional style and
annotate variables with standard types. Thus, it does not
degrade the readability of the code. At compile time, our
verifier performs a quantitative analysis to infer additional
type information that characterizes the resource usage. From
this, constant-resource behavior w.r.t. the high-level model
on all executions of the program is determined automatically.
The granularity with which our resource guarantees hold
against an attacker who can measure the total quantity of
consumed resources is roughly equivalent to what can be
obtained by adhering to a strict constant-time programming
discipline. The certified constant-resource programs prevent
side-channels that are inherent in implementing algorithms
w.r.t. the provided high-level attack model. For example, if
the resource under consideration is execution time, measured
by the number of language constructs executed by the pro-
gram (e.g., the total number of arithmetic operations, func-
tion calls, etc.), then our system provides a defense against
attackers that can observe the same resource measure. To
have a stronger guarantee, e.g., against cache side channels,
our resource model could in principle incorporate memory-
access patterns and instruction caches. Other types of side
channels arising from low-level behaviors, such as branch
prediction or instructions whose resource usage is influenced
by argument values, require corresponding changes to the
resource model. Our technique does not currently model
such timing differences, so is not a defense against such
attacks.
In general, requiring that a program always consumes
constant resources is too restrictive. In most settings, it is suf-
ficient to ensure that the resource behavior of a program does
not depend on selected confidential parts of the program’s
state. To account for this, our type system tracks information
flow using standard techniques, and uses this information to
reason about an adversary who can observe and manipulate
public state as well as resource usage through public outputs.
Intuitively, resource-aware noninterference—the guarantee
enforced by this type system—requires that the parts of
the program that are both affected by secret data and can
influence public outputs, can only make constant use of
resources.
To accomplish this without limiting expressiveness or
imposing stylistic requirements, the type system must be
allowed to freely switch between local and global reasoning.
One extreme would be to ignore the information flow of
the secret values and prove that the whole program has
global constant resource consumption. The other extreme
would be to ensure that every conditional that branches on
a secret value (critical conditionals) uses a constant amount
of resources. However, there are constant-resource programs
in which individual conditionals are not locally constant-
resource (see Section III). As a result, we allow different
levels of global and local reasoning in the type system to
ensure that every critical conditional occurs in a constant-
resource block.
Finally, we show that our type-inference algorithm can be
used to automatically repair programs that make inappropri-
ate non-constant use of resources, by synthesizing constant-
resource ones whose input/output behavior is equivalent. To
this end, we introduce a consume expression that performs
resource padding. The amount of resource padding that is
needed is automatically determined by the type system and
is parametric in the values held by program variables. An
advantage of this technique over prior approaches [17], [18]
is that it does not change the worst-case resource behavior of
many programs. Of course, it would be possible to perform
this transformation by padding resource usage dynamically
at the end of the program execution, but this would require
instrumenting the program to track at runtime the actual
resource usage of the program.
Novel resource type systems: In order to verify constant
resource usage, as well as to produce quantitative upper and
lower-bounds on information leakage via resource behavior,
this work extends the theory behind automatic amortized
resource analysis (AARA) [19], [20], [21] to automatically
derive lower-bound and constant-resource proofs.
Previous AARA techniques are limited to deriving upper
bounds. To this end, the resource potential is used as an
affine quantity: it must be available to cover the cost of
the execution, but excess potential is simply discarded. We
show that if potential is treated as a linear resource, then
corresponding type derivations prove that programs have
constant resource consumption, i.e., the resource consump-
tion is independent of the execution path. Intuitively, this
amounts to requiring that all potential must be used to cover
the cost and that excess potential is not wasted. Furthermore,
we show that if potential is treated as a relevant resource
then we can derive lower bounds on the resource usage.
Following a similar intuition, this requires that all potential is
used, but the available potential does not need to be sufficient
to cover the remaining cost of the execution.
We implemented these type systems in Resource Aware
ML (RAML) [21], a language that supports user-defined data
types, higher-order functions, and other features common to
functional languages. Our type inference uses efficient LP
solving to characterize resource usage for general-purpose
programs in this language. We formalized soundness proofs
for these type systems, as well as the one of classic linear
AARA [19], in the proof assistant Agda. The soundness is
proved w.r.t. an operational cost semantics and, like the type
systems themselves, is parametric in the resource of interest.
Contributions: We make the following contributions:
• A security type system that incorporates our novel
lower-bound and constant-time type systems to prevent
and quantify leakage of secrets through resource side
channels, as well as an LP-based method that auto-
matically transforms programs into constant-resource
versions.
• An implementation of these systems that extends
RAML. We evaluate the implementation on several ex-
amples, including encryption routines and data process-
ing programs that were previously studied in the context
of timing leaks in differentially-private systems [8].
• A mechanization of the soundness proofs the two new
type systems and classic AARA for upper bounds in
Agda. To the best our knowledge, this is also the first
formalization of the soundness of linear AARA for
worst-case bounds.
Technical details including the complete proofs and infer-
ence rules can be found on the RAML website [21].
II. LANGUAGE-LEVEL CONSTANT-RESOURCE PROGRAMS
In this section, we define our notion of a constant-resource
program. We start with an illustrative example: a login with a
username and password. During the login process, the secret
password with a high security level is compared with the low-
security user input, and the result is sent back to the user.
As a result, the pure noninterference property [22], [23] is
violated because data flows from high to low. Nevertheless,
such a program is often considered secure because it satisfies
the relaxed noninterference property [24], [25], [26].
Fig. 1 shows an implementation of the login process in
a monomorphically-typed purely-functional language. The
arguments h and l are lists of integers that are the bytes of
the password and the user input (characters of the hashes).
The function returns true if the input is valid and false
otherwise.
This implementation is vulnerable against an attacker
who measures the execution time of the login function.
Because the function returns false immediately on finding
a mismatched pair of bytes, the resource usage depends
on the size of the longest matching prefix. Based on this
observation, the attacker can mount an efficient attack to
recover the correct password byte-by-byte. For example, if
we assume that there is no noise in the measurements, it
requires at most 256 = 28 calls to the function to reveal one
byte of the secret password. Thus, at most 256 ∗N runs are
needed to recover a secret password of N bytes. If noise
is added to the measurements then the number of necessary
guesses is increased but the attack remains feasible [1], [4].
One method to prevent this sort of attack is to develop a
constant-resource implementation of the compare function
that minimizes the information that an attacker can learn
from the resource-usage information. Ideally, the resource
usage should not be dependent on the content of the secret
password, which means it is constant for fixed sizes of all
public parameters.
Syntax and semantics: We use the purely-functional
first-order language defined in Fig. 2 to formally define
the notion of a language-level constant-time implementation.
The grammar is written using abstract binding trees [27].
However, equivalent expressions in OCaml syntax are used
for examples. The expressions are in let normal form,
meaning that they are formed from variables whenever it
is possible. It makes the typing rules and semantics simpler
without losing expressivity. The syntactic form share has
to be use to introduce multiple occurrences of a variable
in an expression. A value is a boolean constant, an integer
value n, the empty list nil , a list of values [v1, ..., vn], or
let rec compare(h,l) = match h with
| [] →match l with | [] →true
| y::ys →false
| x::xs →match l with
| [] →false
| y::ys →if (x = y) then compare(xs,ys)
else false
Figure 1. The list comparison function compare is not constant resource
w.r.t. h and l. This implementation is insecure against an attacker who
measures its resource usage.
a pair of values (v1, v2). To reason about the resource
T ::= unit | bool | int | L(T ) | T ∗ T
G ::= T → T
e ::= () | true | false | n | x | op⋄(x1, x2) | app(f, x)
| if(x, et, ef ) | let(x, e1, x.e2) | pair(x1, x2) | nil
| match(x, (x1, x2).e) | cons(x1, x2)
| match(x, e1, (x1, x2).e2) | share(x, (x1, x2).e)
v ::= () | true | false | n | nil | [v1, ..., vn] | (v1, v2)
⋄ ∈ {+,−, ∗, div , mod ,=, <>,>,<, and , or }
Figure 2. Syntax of the language
consumption of programs, we first define the operational cost
semantics of the language. It is standard big-step semantics
instrumented with a non-negative resource counter that is
incremented or decremented by a constant at every step.
The semantics is parametric in the cost that is used at each
step and we call a particular set of such cost parameters a
cost model. The constants can be used to indicate the costs
of storing or loading a value in the memory, evaluating a
primitive operation, binding of a value in the environment,
or branching on a Boolean value. It is possible to further
parameterize some constants to obtain a more precise cost
model. For example, the cost of calling a function may vary
according to the number of the arguments. In the following,
we will show that the soundness of type systems does
not rely on any specific values for these constants. In the
examples, we use a cost model in which the constants are
0 for all steps except for calls to the tick function where
tick(q)means that we have resource usage q ∈ Q. A negative
number specifies that resources (such as stack space) become
available.
The cost semantics is formulated using an environment E :
VID → Val that is a finite mapping from a set of variable
identifiers to values. Evaluation judgements are of the form
E
q
q′ e ⇓ v where q, q
′ ∈ Q+0 . The intuitive meaning is
that under the environment E and q available resources, e
evaluates to the value v without running out of resources and
q′ resources are available after the evaluation. The evaluation
consumes δ = q − q′ resource units. Fig. 12 presents some
selected evaluation rules. In the rule E:FUN for function
applications, eg is an expression defining the function’s body
and xg is the argument.
Constant-resource programs: Let Γ : VID → T be a
context that maps variable identifiers to base types T . We
write |= v : T to denote that v is a well-formed value of type
T . The typing rules for values are standard [19], [20], [28]
and we omit them here. An environment E is well-formed
w.r.t. Γ, denoted |= E : Γ, if ∀x ∈ dom(Γ). |= E(x) : Γ(x).
Below we define the notation of size equivalence, written
|v| ≈ |u|, which is a binary relation relating two values of
the same type.
|= v : T |= u : T T ∈ {unit, bool, int}
|v| ≈ |u|
|v1| ≈ |u1| |v2| ≈ |u2|
|(v1, v2)| ≈ |(u1, u2)|
m = n |vi| ≈ |ui|
|[v1, ...vn]| ≈ |[u1, ...um]|
Informally, a program is constant resource if it has the
same quantitative resource consumption under all environ-
ments in which values have the same sizes. Let X ⊆ dom(Γ)
be a set of variables and E1, E2 be two well-formed
environments. Then E1 and E2 are size-equivalent w.r.t. X ,
denoted E1 ≈X E2, when they agree on the sizes of the
variables in X , that is, ∀x ∈ X.|E1(x)| ≈ |E2(x)|.
Definition 1. An expression e is constant resource w.r.t.
X ⊆ dom(Γ), written constX(e), if for all well-formed
environments E1 and E2 such that E1 ≈X E2, the following
statement holds.
If E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1 and E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2 then p1−p
′
1 = p2−p
′
2
We say that a function g(x1, . . . , xn) is constant resource
w.r.t. X if constX(eg) where eg is the expression defining
the function body. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all e, X , and Y ⊆ X , if constY (e) then
constX(e).
Example. The function p compare in Fig. 4 is a manu-
ally padded version of compare, in which the cost model
is defined using tick annotations. It is constant resource
w.r.t. h and l. However, it is not constant resource
w.r.t. h. For instance, p compare([1;2;3],[0;1;2]) has cost
16 but p compare([1;2;1],[0;1]) has cost 12 6= 16. If
the nil case of the second match on l is padded with
tick(5.0); aux(false,xs,[]) then the function is constant re-
source w.r.t. h.
Intuitively, this implementation is constant w.r.t. the given
cost model for fixed sizes of all public parameters, e.g., the
lengths of argument lists. However, it might be not constant
resource at a lower level, e.g., machine code on modern
hardware, because the cost model does not precisely capture
the resource consumption of the instructions executed on the
hardware. Moreover, the compilation process can interfere
with the resource behavior. It may introduce a different type
of leakage that could reveal the secret data on the lower level.
For instance, memory accesses would allow an attacker with
access to the full trace of memory addresses accessed to infer
the content of the password. This leakage can be exploited
via cache-timing attacks [29], [30]. In addition, in some
modern processors, execution time of arithmetic operations
may vary depending on the values of their operands and
the execution time of conditionals is affected by branch
prediction.
III. A RESOURCE-AWARE SECURITY TYPE SYSTEM
In this section we introduce a new type system that
enforces resource-aware noninterference to prevent the leak-
age of information in high-security variables through low-
security channels. In addition to preventing leakage over the
usual input/output information flow channels, our system
incorporates the constant-resource type system discussed
in Section IV to ensure that leakage does not occur over
resource side channels.
The notion of security addressed by our type system
considers an attacker who wishes to learn information about
secret data by making observations of the program’s public
outputs and resource usage. We assume an attacker who is
able to control the value of any variable she is capable of
observing, and thus to influence the program’s behavior and
resource consumption. However, in our model the attacker
can only observe the program’s total resource usage upon ter-
mination, and cannot distinguish between intermediate states
or between terminating and non-terminating executions.
A. Security types
To distinguish parts of the program under the attacker’s
control from those that remain secret, we annotate types
with labels ranging over a lattice (L ,⊑,⊔,⊥). The elements
of L correspond to security levels partially-ordered by ⊑
with a unique bottom element ⊥. The corresponding basic
security types take the form:
k ∈ L
S ::= (unit, k) | (bool, k) | (int, k) | (L(S), k) | S ∗ S
A security context Γs is a partial mapping from variable
identifiers and the program counter pc to security types. The
context assigns a type (unit, k) to pc to track information that
may propagate through control flow as a result of branching
statements. The security type for lists contains a label L(S)
for the elements, as well as a label k for the list’s length.
As in other information flow type systems, the partial
order k ⊑ k′ indicates that the class k′ is at least as
restrictive as k, i.e., k is allowed to flow to k′. We assume a
non-trivial security lattice that contains at least two labels: ℓ
(low security) and h (high security), with ℓ ⊑ h. Following
the convention defined in FlowCaml [31], we also make use
of a guard relation k⊳S, which denotes that all of the labels
appearing in S are at least as restrictive as k. The definition
(E:BIN)
v = E(x1) ⋄ E(x2)
E
q +K op
q op⋄(x1, x2) ⇓ v
(E:FUN)
E[xg 7→ E(x)]
q
q′ eg ⇓ v
E
q +K app
q′ app(g, x) ⇓ v
(E:LET)
E
q −K
let
q′
1
e1 ⇓ v1 E[x 7→ v1]
q′
1
q′ e2 ⇓ v
E
q
q′ let(x, e1, x.e2) ⇓ v
(E:VAR)
x ∈ dom(E)
E
q +K var
q x ⇓ E(x)
(E:IF-TRUE)
E(x) = true E
q −K cond
q′ et ⇓ v
E
q
q′ if(x, et, ef ) ⇓ v
(E:MATCH-L)
E(x) = [v1, ..., vn]
E[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]]
q −K matchL
q′ e2 ⇓ v
E
q
q′ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) ⇓ v
Figure 3. Selected evaluation rules of the operational cost semantics
let rec p_compare(h,l) =
let rec aux(r,h,l) = match h with
| [] →match l with | [] →tick(1.0); r
| y::ys →tick(1.0); false
| x::xs →match l with
| [] →tick(1.0); false
| y::ys →if (x = y) then
tick(5.0); aux(r,xs,ys)
else tick(5.0); aux(false,xs,ys)
in aux(true,h,l)
Figure 4. The manually padded function p compare is constant resource
w.r.t. h and l. However, it is not constant resource w.r.t. only h.
is given in Figure 13 along with its dual notion S ◭ k, called
the collecting relation, and the standard subtyping relation
S1 ≤ S2.
To refer to sets of variables by security class, we write
[Γs]◭k to denote the set of variable identifiers x in the
domain of Γs such that Γs(x) ◭ k, and define k⊳[Γ
s]
similarly. This gives us the set of variables upper- and
lower-bounded by k, respectively. Conversely, we define
[Γs] 6◭k = {x ∈ dom(Γ
s) : Γs(x) 6◭ k}, the set of variables
more restrictive than k. To refer to the set of variables strictly
bounded below by k1 and above by k2, we write k1⊳[Γ
s]◭k2 .
Given two well-formed environmentsE1 and E2, we say that
they are k-equivalent w.r.t Γs if they agree on all variables
with label at most k:
E1 ≡k E2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ [Γ
s]◭k.E1(x) = E2(x)
This relation captures the attacker’s observational equiva-
lence between the two environments. The first-order security
types take the following form. The annotation pc indicates
the security level of the program counter, i.e., a lower-
bound on the label of any observer who is allowed to
learn that a given function has been invoked. The const
annotation denotes that the function body respects resource-
aware noninterference.
pc ∈ L F s ::= S1
pc/const
−−−−→ S2 | S1
pc
−→ S2
A security signature Σs : FID → ℘(F s) \ {∅} is a finite
k ⊑ k′ T ∈ Atoms
k ⊳ (T, k′)
k ⊑ k′ k ⊳ S
k ⊳ (L(S), k′)
k ⊳ S1 k ⊳ S2
k ⊳ S1 ∗ S2
k′ ⊑ k T ∈ Atoms
(T, k′) ◭ k
k′ ⊑ k S ◭ k
(L(S), k′) ◭ k
S1 ◭ k S2 ◭ k
S1 ∗ S2 ◭ k
k⊑k′ T∈Atoms
(T, k) ≤ (T, k′)
k⊑k′ S≤S′
(L(S), k)≤(L(S′), k′)
S1≤S
′
1 S2≤S
′
2
S1∗S2≤S
′
1∗S
′
2
Figure 5. Guards, collecting security labels, and subtyping (Atoms =
{unit, int, bool})
partial mapping from a set of function identifiers to a non-
empty sets of first-order security types.
B. Resource-aware noninterference
We consider an adversary associated with label k1 ∈ L ,
who can observe and control variables in [Γs]◭k1 . Intuitively,
we say that a program P satisfies resource-aware nonin-
terference at level (k1, k2) w.r.t Γ
s, where k1 ⊑ k2, if 1)
the behavior of P does not leak any information about the
contents of variables more sensitive than k1, and 2) does not
leak any information about the contents or sizes of variables
more sensitive than k2. The definition follows.
Definition 2. Let E1 and E2 be two well-formed environ-
ments and Γs be a security context sharing their domain.
An expression e satisfies resource-aware noninterference at
level (k1, k2) for k1 ⊑ k2, if whenever E1 and E2 are:
1) observationally equivalent at k1: E1 ≡k1 E2,
2) size equivalent w.r.t. k1⊳[Γ
s]◭k2: E1 ≈k1⊳[Γs]◭k2 E2
then it follows from E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1 and E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2 that
v1 = v2 and p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2.
The final condition in Defintion 2 ensures two properties.
First, requiring that v1 = v2 provides noninterference [22],
given that E1 and E2 are observationally equivalent. Second,
the requirement p1−p′1 = p2−p
′
2 ensures that the program’s
resource consumption will remain constant w.r.t changes in
variables from the set [Γs] 6◭k1 . This establishes noninterfer-
ence w.r.t the program’s final resource consumption, and thus
prevents the leakage of secret information.
Before moving on, we point out an important subtlety in
this definition. We require that all variables in k1⊳[Γ
s]◭k2
begin with equivalent sizes, but not those in k2⊳[Γ
s]. By
fixing this quantity in the initial environments, we assume
that an attacker is able to control and observe it, so it is not
protected by the definition. This effectively establishes three
classes of variables, i.e., those whose size and content are
observable to the k1-adversary, those whose size (but not
content) is observable, and those whose size and content
remain secret. In the remainder of the text, we will simplify
the technical development by assuming that the third and
most-restrictive class is empty, and that all of the secret
variables reside in k1⊳[Γ
s]◭k2 .
C. Proving resource-aware noninterference
There are two extreme ways of proving resource-aware
noninterference. Assume we already have established clas-
sic noninterference, the first way is to additionally prove
constant-resource usage globally by forgetting the security
labels and showing that the program has constant-resource
usage. This is a sound approach but it requires us to
reason about parts of the programs that are not affected
by secret data. It would therefore result in the rejection
of programs that have the resource-aware noninterference
property but are not constant resource. The second way is to
prove constant resource usage locally by ensuring that every
conditional that branches on secret values is constant time.
However, this local approach is problematic because it is not
compositional. Consider the following examples where rev
is the reverse function.
let f1(b,x) =
let z = if b then x else [] in rev z
let f2(b,x,y) =
let z = if b then let _ = rev y in x
else let _ = rev x in y in rev z
If we assume a cost model in which we count the number
of function calls then the cost of rev(x) is |x|. So rev is
constant resource w.r.t. its argument. Moreover, the expres-
sion if b then x else [] is constant resource. However, f1 is
not constant resource. In contrast, the conditional in f2 is not
constant resource. But f2 is a constant-resource function. The
function f2 can be automatically analyzed with the constant-
resource type system from Section IV while f1 is correctly
rejected.
The idea of our type system for resource-aware nonin-
terference is to allow both global and local reasoning about
resource consumption as well as arbitrary intermediate levels.
We ensure that every expression that is typed in a high
security context is part of a constant-resource expression.
In this way, we get the benefits of local reasoning without
losing compositionality.
D. Typing rules and soundness
We combine our type system for constant resource usage
with a standard information flow type system which based on
FlowCaml [32]. The interface between the two type systems
is relatively light and the idea is applicable to other cost-
analysis methods as well as other security type systems.
In the type judgement, an expression is typed under a type
context Γs and a label pc. The pc label can be considered an
upper bound on the security labels of all values that affect
the control flow of the expression and a lower bound on the
labels of the function’s effects [32]. As mentioned earlier,
we will simplify the technical development by assuming
that the third and most-restrictive class is empty, that is,
the typing rules here guarantee that well-typed expressions
provably satisfy the resource-aware noninterference property
w.r.t. changes in variables from the set [Γs] 6◭k1 , say X . We
define two type judgements of the form
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S and pc; Σs; Γs e : S .
The judgement with the const annotation states that under
a security configuration given by Γs and the label pc, e
has type S and it satisfies resource-ware noninterference
w.r.t. changes in variables from X . The second judgement
indicates that e satisfies the noninterference property but
does not make any guarantees about resource-based side
channels. Selected typing rules are given in Fig. 14. We
implicitly assume that the security types and the resource-
annotated counterparts have the same base types. We write
[const] to denote it is optional, and constX(e) if e is well-
typed in the constant-resource type system w.r.t. X (i.e.,
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A, . (A | A,A), and ∀x ∈ dom(Γ
r) \
X. .(Γr(x) | Γr(x),Γr(x))). We will discuss the constant-
resource type system in Section IV.
Note that the standard information flow typing rules [33],
[32] can be obtained by removing the const annotations
from all judgements. Consider for instance the rule SR:IF
for conditional expressions. By executing the true or false
branches, an adversary could gain information about the
conditional value whose security label is kx. Therefore,
the conditional expression must be type-checked under a
security assumption at least as restrictive as pc and kx.
This is a standard requirement in any information flow type
system. In the following, we will focus on explaining how
the rules restrict the observable resource usage instead of
these classic noninterference aspects.
The most interesting rules are SR:C-GEN and the rules
for let and if expressions, which block leakage over resource
usage when branching on high security data. SR:C-GEN
allows us to globally reason about constant resource usage
for an arbitrary subexpression that has the noninterference
property. For example, we can apply SR:IF, the standard rule
for conditionals, first and then SR:C-GEN to prove that its
super-expression is constant resource. Alternatively, we can
(SR:GEN)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S
(SR:C-GEN)
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S constX(e)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S
(SR:SUBTYPING)
pc; Σs; Γs
[const]
e : S S ≤ S′
pc; Σs; Γs
[const]
e : S′
(SR:FUN)
Σs(f) = S1
pc′
−→ S2
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊑ pc′
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ app(f, x) : S2
(SR:L-ARG)
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s Σs(f) = S1
pc′
−→ S2
pc ⊑ pc′ S1 ◭ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
app(f, x) : S2
(SR:C-FUN)
Σs(f) = S1
pc′/const
−−−−−→ S2
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊑ pc′
pc; Σs; Γs
const
app(f, x) : S2
(SR:IF)
x : (bool, kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs ⊢ et : S
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs ⊢ ef : S pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ if(x, et, ef ) : S
(SR:L-IF)
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
et : S pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
ef : S
x : (bool, kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S kx ⊑ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
if(x, et, ef ) : S
(SR:LET)
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e1 : S1 pc; Σ
s; Γs, x : S1 ⊢ e2 : S2
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ let(x, e1, x.e2) : S2
(SR:L-LET)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e1 : S1 S1 ◭ k1
pc; Σs; Γs, x : S1
const
e2 : S2
pc; Σs; Γs
const
let(x, e1, x.e2) : S2
(SR:C-MATCH-L)
x : (L(S), kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
e1 : S1 kx ⊑ k1
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs, xh : S, xt : (L(S), kx)
const
e2 : S1 pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : S1
Figure 6. Selected security typing rules
use rules such as SR:L-IF and SR:L-LET to locally reason
about resource use. The rule SR:L-LET reflects the fact that
if both e1 and e2 have the resource-aware noninterference
property and the size of x only depends on low security data
then let(x, e1, x.e2) respects resource-aware noninterference.
The reasoning is similar for SR:L-IF where we require that
the variable x does not depend on high security data.
Leaf expressions such as op⋄(x1, x2) and cons(xh, xt)
have constant resource usage. Thus their judgements are
always associated with the qualifier const as shown in the
rule SR:B-OP. The rule SR:C-FUN states that if a function’s
body has the resource-aware noninterference property then
the function application has the resource-aware noninterfer-
ence property too. If the argument’s label is low security
data, bounded below by k1, then the function application has
the resource-aware noninterference property since the value
of the argument is always the same under any k-equivalent
environments. It is reflected by rule SR:L-ARG.
Example. Recall the functions compare and p compare in
Fig. 1. Suppose the content of the first list is secret and the
length is public. Thus it has type (L(int, h), ℓ). While the
second list controlled by adversaries is public, hence it has
type (L(int, ℓ), ℓ). Assume that the pc label is ℓ and [Γs] 6◭k1
= [Γs] 6◭ℓ. The return value’s label depends on the content
of the elements of the first list whose label is h. Thus it must
be assigned the label h to make the functions well-typed.
compare : ((L(int, h), ℓ), (L(int, ℓ), ℓ))
ℓ
−→ (bool, h)
p compare : ((L(int, h), ℓ), (L(int, ℓ), ℓ))
ℓ/const
−−−−→ (bool, h)
Here, both functions satisfy the noninterference property at
security label ℓ. However, only p compare is a resource-
aware noninterference function w.r.t. [Γs] 6◭ℓ, or the secret
list.
Example. Consider the following function cond rev in
which rev is the standard reverse function.
let cond_rev(l1,l2,b1,b2) = if b1 then
let r = if b2 then rev l1; l2
else rev l2; l1 in rev r; () else ()
Assume that l1, l2, b1 and b2 have types (L(int, h), ℓ),
(L(int, h), ℓ), (bool, ℓ), and (bool, h), respectively. Given
the rev function is constant w.r.t. the argument, the inner
conditional does not satisfy resource-aware noninterference.
However, the let expression satisfies resource-aware nonin-
terference w.r.t. [Γs] 6◭ℓ = {l1, l2, b2}. We can derive this by
applying the rule SR:C-GEN. By the rule SR:L-IF, the outer
conditional on low security data satisfies resource-aware
noninterference w.r.t. {l1, l2, b2} at level ℓ. We derive the
following type.
cond rev : ((L(int, h), ℓ), (L(int, h), ℓ), (bool, ℓ), (bool, h))
ℓ/const
−−−−→ (unit, ℓ)
We now prove the soundness of the type system w.r.t. the
resource-aware noninterference property. It states that if e is
a well-typed expression with the const annotation then e is
a resource-aware noninterference expression at level k1.
The following two lemmas are needed in the soundness
proof. The first lemma states that the type system satisfies
the standard simple security property [34] and the second
shows that the type system prove classic noninterference.
Lemma 2. Let pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S or pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S.
For all variables x in e, if S ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x) ◭ k1.
Lemma 3. Let pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S or pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S,
E1 ⊢ e ⇓ v1, E2 ⊢ e ⇓ v2, and E1 ≡k1 E2. Then v1 = v2 if
S ◭ k1.
Theorem 1. If |= E : Γs, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S then e is a resource-aware nonin-
terference expression at k1.
Proof: The proof is done by induction on the structure
of the typing derivation and the evaluation derivation. Let X
be the set of variables [Γs] 6◭k1 . For all environments E1, E2
such that E1 ≈X E2 and E1 ≡k1 E2, if E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1 and
E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2. We then show that p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2 and
v1 = v2 if S ◭ k1. We illustrate one case of the conditional
expression. Suppose e is of the form if(x, et, ef), thus the
typing derivation ends with an application of either the rule
SR:L-IF or SR:C-GEN. By Lemma 3, if S ◭ k1 then v1 =
v2.
• Case SR:L-IF. By the hypothesis we have E1(x) =
E2(x). Assume that E1(x) = E2(x) = true , by the
evaluation rule E:IF-TRUE, E1
p1 −K
cond
p′
1
et ⇓ v1
and E2
p2 −K
cond
p′
2
et ⇓ v2. By induction for et we
have p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2. It is similar for E1(x) =
E2(x) = false .
• Case SR:C-GEN. Since E1 ≈X E2 w.r.t. Γs, we have
E1 ≈X E2 w.r.t. Γr. By the hypothesis we have
constX(e). Thus by Theorem 3, it follows p1 − p′1 =
p2 − p′2.
IV. TYPE SYSTEMS FOR LOWER BOUNDS AND CONSTANT
RESOURCE USAGE
We now discuss how to automatically and statically verify
constant resource usage, upper bounds, and lower bounds.
For upper bounds we rely on existing work on automatic
amortized resource analysis [19], [21]. This technique is
based on an affine type system. For constant resource usage
and lower bounds we introduce two new sub-structural
resource-annotated type systems: The type system for con-
stant resource usage is linear and the one for lower bounds
is relevant.
A. Background
Amortized analysis: To statically analyze a program
with the potential method [35], a mapping from program
points to potentials must be established. One has to show
that the potential at every program point suffices to cover
the cost of any possible evaluation step and the potential of
the next program point. The initial potential is then an upper
bound on the resource usage of the program.
let rec filter_succ(l) =
match l with
| [] →tick(1.0); []
| x::xs →if x > 0 then
tick(8.0); filter_succ(xs)
else tick(3.0); (x+1)::filter_succ(xs)
let fs_twice(l) =
filter_succ(filter_succ(l))
Figure 7. Two OCaml functions with linear resource usage. The worst-
case number of ticks executed by fitler succ(ℓ) and fs twice(ℓ) is 8|ℓ|+ 1
and 11|ℓ|+ 2 respectively. In the best-case the functions execute 3|ℓ|+ 1
and 6|ℓ|+ 2 ticks, respectively. The resource consumption is not constant.
Linear potential for upper bounds: To automate amor-
tized analysis, we fix a format of the potential functions
and use LP solving to find the optimal coefficients. To infer
linear potential functions, inductive data types are annotated
with a non-negative rational numbers q [19]. For example,
the type Lq( bool ) of Boolean lists with potential q defines
potential q·n, where n is the number of list’s elements.
This idea is best explained by example. Consider the
function filter succ below that filters out positive numbers
and increments non-positive numbers. As in RAML, we use
OCaml syntax and tick commands to specify resource usage.
If we filter out a number then we have a high cost (8 resource
units) since x is, e.g., sent to an external device. If x is
incremented we have a lower cost of 3 resource units. As a
result, the worst-case resource consumption of filter succ(ℓ)
is 8|ℓ|+1 (where 1 is for the cost that occurs in the nil case
of the match). The function fs twice(ℓ) applies filter succ
twice, to ℓ and to the result of filter succ(ℓ). The worst-case
behavior appears if no list element is filtered out in the first
call and all elements are filtered out in the second call. The
worst-case behavior is thus 11|ℓ|+2. These upper bounds can
be expressed with the following annotated function types,
which can be derived using local type rules in Fig. 8.
filter succ : L8(int)
1/0
−−→ L0(int)
fs twice : L11(int)
2/0
−−→ L0(int)
Intuitively, the first function type states that an initial poten-
tial of 8|ℓ|+1 is sufficient to cover the cost of filter succ(ℓ)
and there is 0|ℓ′|+0 potential left where ℓ′ is the result of the
computation. This is just one possible potential annotation of
many. The right choice of the potential annotation depends
on the use of the function result. For example, for the
inner call of filter succ in fs twice we need the following
annotation.
filter succ : L11(int)
2/1
−−→ L8(int)
It states that the initial potential of 11|ℓ|+ 2 is sufficient to
cover the cost of filter succ(ℓ) and there is 8|ℓ′|+1 potential
left to be assigned to the returned list ℓ′. The potential of the
result can then be used with the previous type of filter succ
to pay for the cost of the outer call.
filter succ : Lp(int)
q/q′
−−→ Lr(int) | q ≥ q′+1 ∧ p ≥ 8
∧ p ≥ 3+r
We can summarize all possible types of filter succ with a
linear constraint system. In the type inference, we generate
such a constraint system and solve it with an off-the-shelf LP
solver. To obtain tight bounds, we perform a whole-program
analysis and minimize the coefficients in the input potential.
Surprisingly, this approach—as well as the new con-
cepts we introduce here—can be extended to polynomial
bounds [36], higher-order functions [37], [21], polymor-
phism [38], and user-defined inductive types [38], [21].
B. Resource annotations
The resource-annotated types are base types in which the
inductive data types are annotated with non-negative rational
numbers, called resource annotations.
A ::= unit | bool | int | Lp(A) | A ∗A (for p ∈ Q+0 )
A type context, Γr : VID → A , is a partial mapping
from variable identifiers to resource-annotated types. The
underlying base type and context denoted by Â, and Γ̂r
respectively can be obtained by removing the annotations.
We extend all definitions such as |v|, |= E : Γ and ≈ for
base data types to resource-annotated data types by ignoring
the annotations.
We now formally define the notation of potential. The
potential of a value v of type A, written Φ(v : A), is defined
by the function Φ : Val → Q+0 as follows.
Φ( () : unit) = Φ(b : bool) = Φ(n : int) = 0
Φ((v1, v2) : A1 ∗A2) = Φ(v1 : A1) + Φ(v2 : A2)
Φ([v1, · · · , vn] : L
p(A)) = n·p+Σni=1Φ(vi : A)
Example. The potential of a list v = [b1, · · · , bn] of
type Lp(bool) is n·p. Similarly, a list of lists of Booleans
v = [v1, · · · , vn] of type Lp(Lq(bool)), where vi =
[bi1, · · · , bimi ], has the potential n·p+ (m1 + · · ·+mn)·q.
Let Γr be a context and E be a well-formed environment
w.r.t. Γr. The potential of X ⊆ dom(Γr) under E is defined
as ΦE(X : Γ
r) = Σx∈XΦ(E(x) : Γ
r(x)). The potential of
Γr is ΦE(Γ
r) = ΦE(dom(Γ
r) : Γr). Note that if x 6∈ X then
ΦE(X : Γ
r) = ΦE[x 7→v](X : Γ
r). The following lemma
states that the potential is the same under two well-formed
size-equivalent environments.
Lemma 4. If E1 ≈X E2 then ΦE1(X : Γ
r) = ΦE2(X : Γ
r).
Annotated first-order data types are given as follows,
where q and q′ are rational numbers.
F ::= A1
q/q′
−−→ A2
A resource-annotated signature Σr : FID → ℘(F ) \ {∅}
is a partial mapping from function identifiers to a non-
empty sets of annotated first-order types. That means a
function can have different resource annotations depending
on the context. The underlying base types are denoted by F̂ .
And the underlying base signature is denoted by Σ̂r where
Σ̂r(f) = Σ̂r(f).
C. Type system for constant resource consumption
The typing rules of the constant-resource type system
define judgements of the form:
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
where e is an expression and q, q′ ∈ Q+0 . The intended
meaning is that in the environment E, q+ΦE(Γ
r) resource
units are sufficient to evaluate e to a value v with type A
and there are exactly q′ +Φ(v : A) resource units left over.
The typing rules form a linear type system. It ensures that
every variable is used exactly once by allowing exchange
but not weakening or contraction [39]. The rules can be
organized into syntax directed and structural rules.
Syntax-directed rules: The syntax-directed rules are
shared among all type systems and selected rules are listed in
Fig. 8. Rules like A:VAR and A:B-OP for leaf expressions
(e.g., variable, binary operations, pairs) have fixed costs as
specified by the constants Kx. Note that we require all
available potential to be spent. The cost of the function call is
represented by the constantK app in the rule A:FUN and the
argument carries the potential to pay for the function execu-
tion. In the rule A:LET, the cost of binding is represented by
the constant K let . The potentials carried by the contexts Γr1
and Γr2 are passed sequentially through the sub derivations.
Note that the contexts are disjoint since our type system is
linear. Multiple uses of variables must be introduced through
the rule A:SHARE. Thus, the context split is deterministic.
The rule A:IF is the key rule for ensuring constant resource
usage. By using the same context Γr for typing both et and
ef , we ensure that the conditional expression has the same
resource usage in size-equivalent environments independent
of the value of the Boolean variable x. The rules for induc-
tive data types are crucial for the interaction of the linear
potential annotations with the constant potential, in which
A:CONS shows how constant potential can be associated
with a new data structure. The dual is A:MATCH-L, which
shows how potential associated with data can be released.
It is important that these transitions are made in a linear
fashion: potential is neither lost or gained.
Sharing relation:
A ∈ {unit, bool, int}
.(A | A,A)
.(A | A1, A2) .(B | B1, B2)
.(A ∗B | A1 ∗ B1, A2 ∗B2)
.(A | A1, A2) p = p1 + p2
.(Lp(A) | Lp1(A1), L
p2(A2))
The share expression makes multiple uses of a variable
explicit. While multiple uses of a variable seem to be in
conflict with the linear type discipline, the sharing relation
. (A | A1, A2) ensures that potential is treated in a linear
(A:VAR)
Σr; x : A
K
var
0 x : A
(A:B-OP)
⋄ ∈ { and , or }
Σr;x1 : bool, x2 : bool
K
op
0 op⋄(x1, x2) : bool
(A:FUN)
Σr(f) = A1
q/q′
−−−→ A2
Σr;x : A1
q+K
app
q′ app(f, x) : A2
(A:LET)
Σr ; Γr1
q−K
let
q′
1
e1 : A1 Σ
r; Γr2, x : A1
q
′
1
q′ e2 : A2
Σr ; Γr1,Γ
r
2
q
q′ let(x, e1, x.e2) : A2
(A:IF)
Σr; Γr
q −K cond
q′ et : A Σ
r; Γr
q −K cond
q′ ef : A
Σr; Γr, x : bool
q
q′ if(x, et, ef ) : A
(A:MATCH-L)
Σr; Γr
q −K
matchN
q′ e1 : A1 Σ
r; Γr, xh : A, xt : L
p(A)
q + p −K
matchL
q′ e2 : A1
Σr; Γr, x : Lp(A)
q
q′ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : A1
(A:CONS)
Σr;xh : A, xt : L
p(A)
p+K
cons
0 cons(xh, xt) : L
p(A)
(A:SHARE)
Σr; Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B .(A | A1, A2)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : B
Figure 8. Selected syntax-directed rules of the resource type systems. They are shared among all type systems.
way. It apportions potential to ensure that the total potential
associated with all uses is equal to the potential initially
associated with the variable. This relation is only defined
for structurally-identical types which differ in at most the
resource annotations.
Structural rules: To allow more programs to be typed
we add two structural rules to the type system which can be
applied to every expression. These rules are specific to the
the constant-resource type system.
(C:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B .(A | A,A)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
(C:RELAX)
Σr; Γr
p
p′ e : A
q ≥ p q − p = q′ − p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
The rule C:RELAX reflects the fact that if it is sufficient
to evaluate e with p available resource units and there are p′
resource units left over then e can be evaluated with p + c
resource units and there are exactly p′ + c resource units
left over, where c ∈ Q+0 . Rule C:WEAKENING states that
an extra variable can be added into the given context if its
potential is zero. The condition is enforced by .(A | A,A)
since Φ(v : A) = Φ(v : A) + Φ(v : A) or Φ(v : A) = 0.
These rules can be used in branchings such as the conditional
or the pattern match to ensure that subexpressions are typed
using the same contexts and potential annotations.
Example. Consider again the function p compare in Fig. 4
in which the nil case of the second matching on l is padded
with tick(5.0); aux(false,xs,[]) and the resource consumption
is defined using tick annotations. The resource usage of
p compare(h, ℓ) is constant w.r.t. h, that is, it is exactly
5|h|+ 1. This is reflected by the following type.
p compare : (L5(int), L0(int))
1/0
−−→ bool
It can be understood as follows. If the input list h carries
5 potential units per element then it is sufficient to cover
the cost of p compare(h, ℓ), no potential is wasted, and 0
potential is left.
Soundness: That soundness theorem states that if e
is well-typed in the resource type system and evaluates to
a value v then the difference between the initial and the
final potential is the net resources usage. Moreover, if the
potential annotations of the return value and all variables
not belonging to a set X ⊆ dom(Γr) are zero then e is
constant-resource w.r.t. X .
Theorem 2. If |= E : Γr, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A,
then for all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = q+ΦE(Γ
r) + r, there
exists p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′ + Φ(v :
A) + r.
Proof: The proof proceeds by a nested induction on the
derivation of the evaluation judgement and the typing judge-
ment, in which the derivation of the evaluation judgement
takes priority over the typing derivation. We need to induct
on both, evaluation and typing derivation. An induction on
only the typing derivation would fail for the case of function
application, which increases the size of the typing derivation,
while the size of the evaluation derivation does not increase.
An induction on only the evaluation judgement would fail
because of structural rules such as C:WEAKENING. If such a
rule is the final step in the derivation then the size of typing
derivation decreases while the length of evaluation derivation
is unchanged. The additional constant r is needed to make
the induction case for the let rule work.
Theorem 3. If |= E : Γr, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A, .
(A | A,A), and ∀x ∈ dom(Γr)\X. .(Γr(x) | Γr(x),Γr(x))
then e is constant resource w.r.t. X ⊆ dom(Γr).
D. Type system for upper bounds
If we treat potential as an affine resource then we arrive
at the original amortized analysis for upper bounds [19]. To
this end, we allow unrestricted weakening and a relax rule
in which we can waste potential.
(U:RELAX)
Σr; Γr
p
p′ e : A q ≥ p
q − p ≥ q′ − p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
(U:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
Additionally, we can use subtyping to waste linear poten-
tial [19]. (See the dual definition for subtyping for lower
bounds below.) Similarly to Theorem 2, we can prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 4. If |= E : Γr, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A,
then for all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p ≥ q+ΦE(Γ
r) + r, there
exists p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ ≥ q′ + Φ(v :
A) + r.
E. Type system for lower bounds
The type judgements for lower bounds have the same form
and data types as the type judgements for constant resource
usage and upper bounds. However, the intended meaning
of the judgement Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A is the following. Under
given environmentE, less than q+ΦE(Γ) resource units are
not sufficient to evaluate e to a value v so that more than
q′ +Φ(v : A) resource units are left over.
The syntax-directed typing rules are the same as the rules
in the constant-resource type system as given in Fig. 8. In
addition, we have the structural rules in Fig. 9. The rule
L:RELAX is dual to U:RELAX. In L:RELAX, potential is
treated as a relevant resource: We are not allowed to waste
potential but we can create potential out of the blue if we
ensure that we either use it or pass it to the result. The
same idea is formalized for the linear potential with the
sub-typing rules L:SUBTYPE and L:SUPERTYPE. The sub-
typing relation is defined as follows.
A∈{unit, bool, int}
A <: A
A1<:A2 p1≤p2
L
p1(A1) <: L
p2(A2)
A1<:A2 B1<:B2
A1∗A2 <: B1∗B2
It holds that if A <: B then Â = B̂ and Φ(v : A) ≤
Φ(v : B). Suppose that it is not sufficient to evaluate e with
p available resource units to get p′ resource units left over.
L:SUBTYPE reflects the fact that we also cannot evaluate e
with p resources get more than p′ resource units after the
evaluation. L:SUPERTYPE says that we also cannot evaluate
e with less than p and get p′ resource units afterwards.
Example. Consider again the functions filter succ and
fs twice given in Fig. 7 in which the resource consumption is
defined using tick annotations. The best-case resource usage
of filter succ(ℓ) is 3|ℓ|+ 1 and best-case resource usage of
(L:RELAX)
Σr; Γr
p
p′ e : A
q ≥ p q−p ≤ q′−p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
(L:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B .(A | A,A)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
(L:SUBTYPE)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e:A A<:B
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B
(L:SUPERTYPE)
Σr; Γr, x:B
q
q′ e : C A<:B
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : C
Figure 9. Structural rules for lower bounds.
(L:CONTR)
Σr ; Γr, x1 : A,x2 : A
q
q′ e : B A2 <: A
Σr; Γr, x1 : A, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B A1 <: A
Σr; Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B .(A | A1, A2)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : B
Figure 10. Derivation of the contraction rule for lower-bounds.
fs twice(ℓ) is 6|ℓ| + 2. This is reflected by the following
function types for lower bounds.
filter succ : L3(int)
1/0
−−→ L0(int)
fs twice : L6(int)
2/0
−−→ L0(int)
To derive the lower bound for fs twice, we need the same
compositional reasoning as for the derivation of the upper
bound. For the inner call of filter succ we use the type
filter succ : L6(int)
2/1
−−→ L3(int) .
It can be understood as follows. If the input list carries 6
potential units per element then, for each element, we can
either use all 6 (if case) or we can use 3 and assign 3 to
the output (else case).
The type system for lower bounds is a relevant type
system [39]. That means every variable is used at least once
by allowing exchange and contraction properties, but not
weakening. However, as in the constant-time type system
we allow a restricted form of weakening if the potential
annotations are zero using the rule L:WEAKENING. The
following lemma states formally the contraction property
which is derived in Fig. 10.
Lemma 5. If Σr; Γr, x1 : A, x2 : A
q
q′ e : B then
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : B
The following theorems establish the soundness of the
analysis. The proofs can be found in the TR [28]. Theo-
rem 6 is proved by induction and Theorem 5 follows by
contradiction.
Theorem 5. Let |= E : Γr, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and Σr; Γr
q
q′ e :
A. Then for all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p < q + ΦE(Γ
r) + r,
there exists no p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ ≥
q′ +Φ(v : A) + r.
Theorem 6. Let |= E : Γr, E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and Σr; Γr
q
q′ e :
A. Then for all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v we have
q + ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′ +Φ(v : A)) ≤ p− p′.
F. Mechanization
We mechanized the soundness proofs for both the two
new type systems as well as the classic AARA type system
using the proof assistant Agda. The development is roughly
4000 lines of code, which includes the inference rules, the
operational cost semantics, a proof of type preservation, and
the soundness theorems for each type system.
One notable difference is our implementation of the typing
contexts. In Agda our contexts are implemented as lists of
pairs of variables and their types. Moreover, in our typing
rules whenever a variable is added to the context we require
the variable is fresh with respect to the existing context.
This requirement is important as it allows us to preserve
the invariant that the context is well formed with respect
to the environment as we induct over typing and evaluation
judgements in our soundness proofs. Furthermore, as our
typing contexts are ordered lists we added an exchange rule
to our typing rules.
Another important detail is in the implementation of
potential. Potential Φ(v : A) for a value only is defined
for well formed inputs. Inputs such as Φ( nil : bool) are not
defined. Agda is total language and as such prohibits users
from implementing partial functions. Thus we require in our
Agda implementation that when calculating the potential of
a value of a given type the user provide a derivation that
the value is well formed with respect to that type. Similarly
when calculating the potential of a context, ΦE(Γ
r), with
respect to an environment we require that the user provide
a derivation that the context is well formed with respect to
that environment.
Lastly, whereas the type systems and proofs presented
here used positive rational numbers, in the Agda implemen-
tation we use natural numbers. This deviation was simply
due to the lacking support for rationals in the Agda standard
library. By replacing a number of trivial lemmas, mostly
related to associativity and commutativity, the proofs and
embeddings could be transformed to use rational numbers
instead.
V. QUANTIFYING AND TRANSFORMING OUT LEAKAGES
We present techniques to quantify the amount of informa-
tion leakage through resource usage and transform leaky pro-
grams into constant resource programs. The quantification re-
lies on the lower and upper bounds inferred by our resource
type systems. The transformation pads the programs with
dummy computations so that the evaluations consume the
same amount of resource usage and the outputs are identical
with the original programs. In the current implementation,
these dummy computations are added into programs by
users and the padding parameters are automatically added
by our analyzer to obtain the optimal values. It would be
straightforward to make the process fully automatic but
the interactive flavor of our approach helps to get a better
understanding of the system.
A. Quantification
Recall from Section III that we assume an adversary at
level k1 who is always able to observe 1) the values of
variables in [Γs]◭k1 , and 2) the final resource consumption
of the program. For many programs, it may be the case
that changes to the secret variables [Γs] 6◭k1 effect observable
differences in the program’s final resource consumption, but
only allow the attacker to learn partial information about
the corresponding secrets. In this section, we show that the
upper and lower-bound information provided by our type
systems allow us to derive bounds on the amount of partial
information that is leaked.
To quantify the amount of leaked information, we measure
the number of distinct environments that the attacker could
deduce as having produced a given resource consumption
observation. However, because there may be an unbounded
number of such environments, we parameterize this quantity
on the size of the values contained in each environment. Let
E
N denote the space of environments with values of size
characterized by N . Given an environmentE and expression
e, define U(E, e) = pδ such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and pδ =
p − p′. Then for an expression e and resource observation
pδ, we define the set RN (e, pδ) which captures the attacker’s
uncertainty about the environment which produced pδ:
RN (e, pδ) = {E
′ ∈ EN : U(E, e) = pδ}
Notice that when |RN (e, p)| = 1, the attacker can deduce
exactly which environment was used, whereas when this
quantity is large little additional information is learned from
pδ. This gives us a natural definition of leakage, which is
obtained by aggregating the inverse of the cardinality of RN
over the possible initial environments of e:
CN (e) =
( ∑
E∈EN
1
|RN (e, U(E, e))|
)
− 1
CN (e) corresponds to our intuition about leakage. When e
leaks no information through resource consumption, then
each term in the summation will be 1/|Esizes| giving
CN (e) = 0, whereas if e leaks perfect information about
its starting environment then each term will be 1, leading to
CN (e) = |EN | − 1.
Theorem 7. Let P eN be the complete set of resource obser-
vations producible by expression e under environments of
size N , i.e.,
P eN = {p : ∃E ∈ E
N .U(E, e) = p}
Then |P eN | = CN (e) + 1.
Lemma 6. Let le(N) and ue(N) be lower and upper-
bounds on the resource consumption of e for inputs of
size N . If U(E, e) ∈ Z for all environments E, then
CN (e) ≤ ue(N)− le(N).
Lemma 7. Assume that environments are sampled uniform-
randomly from EN . Then the Shannon entropy of P eN is
given by CN (e): H(P
e
N ) ≤ log2(CN (e) + 1)
Lemma 6 leverages Theorem 7 to derive an upper-bound
on leakage from upper and lower resource bounds. This
result only holds when the resource observations of e are
integral, which ensures the interval [le(N), ue(N)] ⊇ P eN is
finite. Lemma 7 relates CN (e) to Shannon entropy, which
is commonly used to characterize information leakage [40],
[41], [42].
B. Transformation
To transform programs into constant resource programs
we extend the type system for constant resource use from
Section IV. Recall that the type system treats potential in
a linear fashion to ensure that potential is not wasted. We
will now add sinks for potential which will be able to absorb
excess potential. At runtime the sinks will consume the exact
amount of resources that have been statically-absorbed to
ensure that potential is still treated in a linear way. The
advantage of this approach is that the worst-case resource
consumption is often not affected by the transformation.
Additionally, we do not need to keep track of resource usage
at runtime to pad the resource usage at the sinks, because
the amount of resource that must be discarded is statically-
determined by the type system. Finally, we automatically
obtain a type derivation that serves as a proof that the
transformation is constant resource.
More precisely, the sinks are represented by the syntactic
form: consume(A,p)(x). Here, A is a resource-annotated type
and p ∈ Q≥0 is a non-negative rational number. The idea
is that A and p define the resource consumption of the
expression. In the implementation, the user only has to write
consume(x), and the annotations are added via automatic
syntax elaboration during the resource type inference.
Let E be a well-formed environment w.r.t. Γr. For
every x ∈ dom(Γ) with Γr(x) = A, the expression
consume(A,p)(x) consumes Φ(E(x) : A) + p resource units
and evaluates to () . The evaluation and typing rules for
sinks are:
(E:CONSUME)
q = q′ +Φ(E(x) : A) + p
E
q
q′ consume(A,p)(x) ⇓ ()
(A:CONSUME)
Σr;x:A
p
0 consume(A,p)(x) : unit
The extension of the proof of Theorem 2 to consume
expressions is straightforward.
Adding consume expressions: Let ei be a
subexpression of e and let e′i be the expression
let(z, consume(x1, · · · , xn), z.ei) for some variables
xi. Let e
′ be the expression obtained from e by replacing ei
with e′i. We write e →֒ e
′ for such a transformation. Note
that additional share and let expressions have to be added
to convert e′i into share-let normal form.
Lemma 8. If Σ;Γ ⊢ e : T , E ⊢ e ⇓ v, and e →֒ e′ then
Σ;Γ ⊢ e′ : T and E ⊢ e′ ⇓ v.
To transform an expression e into a constant resource
expressions we perform multiple transformations e →֒ e′
which do not affect the type and semantics of e. This can be
done automatically but in our implementation it works in an
interactive fashion, meaning that users are responsible for the
locations where consume expressions are put. The analyzer
will infer the annotations A and constants p of the given
consume expressions during type inference. If the inference
is successful then we have constX(e
′) for the transformed
program e′.
Example. Recall the function compare form Fig. 1. To
turn compare into a constant resource function. We insert
consume expressions as shown below. Users can insert many
consume expressions and the analyzer will determine which
consumes are actually needed.
let rec c_compare(h,l) = match h with
| [] →match l with
| [] →tick(1.0); true
| y::ys →tick(1.0); false
| x::xs →match l with
| [] →tick(1.0); consume(xs); false
| y::ys →if (x = y) then
tick(5.0); c_compare(xs,ys)
else tick(5.0); consume(xs); false
We automatically obtain the following typing of the trans-
formed function and the consume expressions:
c compare : (L5(int), L0(int))
1/0
−−→ bool
consume : L5(int)
5/0
−−→ unit (at line 6)
consume : L5(int)
1/0
−−→ unit (at line 9)
The worst-case resource consumption of the unmodified
function c compare is 1+5|h|. Thus the consumption of the
first consume must be 5+ 5(|h| − 1− |ℓ|) when h is longer
than l. Otherwise, the consumption is zero. The second one
consumes 1+5(|h1|− 1), where h1 is the sub-list of h from
the first node which is different from the corresponding node
in l.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Type Inference: Type inference for the constant re-
source and lower bound systems are implemented in
Constant Function LOC Metric Resource Usage Time
cond rev : (L(int), L(int), bool) → unit 20 steps 13n+13x+35 0.03s
trunc rev : (L(int), int) → L(int) 28 function calls 1n 0.06s
ipquery : L(logline) → (L(int), L(int)) 86 steps 86n+99 0.86s
kmeans : L(float, float) → L(float, float) 170 steps 1246n+3784 8.18s
tea enc : (L(int), L(int), nat) → L(int) 306 ticks 128n2z+32nxz+1184nz+96n+128z+96 13.73s
tea dec : (L(int), L(int), nat) → L(int) 306 ticks 128n2z+32nxz+1184nz+96n+96z+96 14.34s
Function LOC Metric Lower Bound Time Upper Bound Time
compare : (L(int), L(int)) → bool 60 steps 7 0.05s 16n+7 0.09s
find : (L(int), int) → bool 40 steps 5 0.04s 14n+5 0.02s
rsa : (L(bool), int, int) → int 42 multiplications 1n 0.07s 2n 0.05s
filter : L(int) → L(int) 30 steps 13n+5 0.05s 20n+5 0.04s
isortlist : L(L(int)) → L(L(int)) 60 steps 21n+5 0.13s 12n2+9n+10n2m−10nm+5 0.43s
bfs tree : (btree, int) → btree option 116 steps 15 0.30s 92n+24 0.32s
Table I
AUTOMATICALLY-DERIVED BOUNDS WITH RESOURCE AWARE ML
RAML [21]. RAML is integrated into Inria’s OCaml com-
piler and supports polynomial bounds, user-defined inductive
types, higher-order functions, polymorphism, arrays, and
references. All features are implemented for the new type
systems, as they are straightforward extensions of the sim-
plified rules presented in this paper. The implementation is
publicly available in an easy-to-use web interface [43].
The type inference is technically similar to the inference
of upper bounds [19]. We first integrate the structural
rules of the respective type system in the syntax directed
rules. For example, weakening and relaxation is applied at
branching points such as conditional. We then compute a
type derivation in which all resource annotations are replace
by (yet unknown) variables. For each type rule we produce
a set of linear constraints that specify the properties of valid
annotations. These linear constraints are then solved by the
LP solver CLP to obtain a type derivation in which the
annotations are rational numbers.
An interesting challenge lies in finding a solution for
the linear constraints that leads to the best bound for a
given function. For upper bounds, we simply disregard
the potential of the result type and provide an objective
function that minimizes the annotations of the arguments.
The same strategy works the constant-time type systems. An
interesting property is that the solution to the linear program
is unique if we require that the potential of the result type
is zero. To obtain the optimal lower bound we want to
maximize the potential of the arguments and minimize the
potential of the result. We currently simply maximize the
potential of the arguments while requiring the potential of
the result to be zero. Another approach would be to first
minimize the output potential and then maximize the input
potential.
Resource-aware noninterference: We are currently in-
tegrating our constant-time type system with FlowCaml [31].
The combined inference is based on the typing rules in
Fig. 14. It is possible to derive a set of type inference
rules in the same way as for FlowCaml [44], [32]. One
of the challenges in the integration is interfacing Flow-
Caml’s type inference with our constant-time type system
in rule SR:C-GEN. In the implementation, we intend for
each application of SR:C-GEN to generate an intermediate
representation of the expression in RAML for the expression
under consideration, in which all types are annotated with
fresh resource annotations along with the set of variables
X . The expression is marked with the qualifier const if
RAML can prove that it is constant time. The type inference
algorithm always tries to apply the syntax-directed rules first
before using SR:C-GEN.
Evaluation: Table I shows the verification and compu-
tation of constant resource usage, lower, and upper bounds
for different functions, together with the lines of code (LOC)
of the analyzed function and the run time of the analysis
in seconds. Note that lower and upper bounds are identical
when a function is constant. In the computed bounds, n is
the size of the first argument, m = max1≤i≤nmi where
mi are the sizes of the first argument’s elements, x is the
size of the second argument, and z is the value of the third
argument.
The cost models are specified by different cost metrics
that are appropriate for the respective application, e.g.,
number of evaluation steps or number of multiplication
operations. Note that the computed upper bounds are also
the resource usages of functions which are padded using
consume expressions. The experiments were run on a ma-
chine with Intel Core i5 2.4 GHz processor and 8GB RAM
under OS X 10.11.5. The run time of the analysis varies
from 0.02 to 14.34 seconds depending on the function’s
code complexity. The example programs that we analyzed
consist of commonly-used primitives ( cond rev , trunc rev ,
compare , find , filter ), functions related to cryptography
( tea enc , tea dec , rsa ), and examples taken from Haeber-
lan et al. [8] ( ipquery , kmeans ). The full source code of
the examples can be found in the technical report [28].
The encryption functions tea enc and tea dec corre-
spond to the encryption and decryption routines of the
Corrected Block Tiny Encryption Algorithm [45], a block
cipher presented by Needham and Wheeler in an unpub-
lished technical report in 1998. Our implementation correctly
identifies these operations as constant-time in the number
of primitive operations performed. We applied this cost
model for the tea examples due to the presence of bitwise
operations in the original algorithm, which are not currently
supported in RAML. In order to derive a more meaningful
bound, we implemented bitwise operations in the example
source and counted them as single operations.
The two examples taken from Haeberlen et al. [8]
were originally created in a study of timing attacks in
differentially-private data processing systems. ipquery ap-
plies pattern matching to a database derived from Apache
server logs, counting the number of matches and non-
matches. kmeans implements the k-means clustering algo-
rithm [46], which partitions a set of geometric points into k
clusters that minimize the total inter-cluster distance between
points. Haeberlen et al. demonstrated that when a query
applied to a dataset introduces attacker-observable timing
variations, then the privacy guarantees provided by differen-
tial privacy are negated. To address this, they proposed a
mitigation approach that enforces constant-time behavior by
aborting or padding the query’s runtime. Our implementation
is able to determine that the queries, as we implemented
them, were constant-time to begin with, and thus did not
need black-box mitigation.
VII. RELATED WORK
Resource bounds: Our work builds on past research on
automatic amortized resource analysis (AARA). AARA has
been introduced by Hofmann and Jost for a strict first-order
functional language with built-in data types to derive linear
heap-memory bounds [19]. It has then been extended to
polynomial bounds [47], [36], [48], [59], [60] for strict and
higher-order [37], [21] functions. AARA has also been used
to derive linear bounds for lazy functional programs [49],
[50] and object-oriented programs [51], [52]. In another line
of work, the technique has been integrated into separation
logic [53] to derive bounds that depend on mutable data-
structures, and into Hoare logic to derive linear bounds that
depend on integers [54], [55]. Amortized analysis has also
been used to manually verify the complexity of algorithms
and data-structures using proof assistants [56], [57]. In
contrast to our work, these techniques can only derive upper
bounds and cannot prove constant resource consumption.
The focus on upper bounds is shared with automatic re-
source analysis techniques that are based on sized types [61],
[62], linear dependent types [63], [64], and other type sys-
tems [65], [66], [67]. Similarly, semiautomatic analyses [68],
[69], [70], [71] focus on upper bounds too.
Automatic resource bound analysis is also actively studied
for imperative languages using recurrence relations [72],
[73], [74] and abstract interpretation [75], [76], [77], [78],
[79]. While these techniques focus on worst-case bounds,
it is possible to use similar techniques for deriving lower
bounds [80]. The advantage of our method is that it is
compositional, deals well with amortization effects, and
works for language features such as user-defined data types
and higher-order functions. Another approach to (worst-
case) bound analysis is based on techniques from term
rewriting [81], [82], [83], which mainly focus on upper
bounds. One line of work [84] derives lower bounds on the
worst-case behavior of programs which is different from our
lower bounds on the best-case behavior.
Side channels: Analyzing and mitigating potential
sources of side channel leakage is an increasingly well-
studied area. Several groups have proposed using type
systems or other program analyses to transform programs
into constant-time versions by padding with “dummy” com-
mands [85], [86], [87], [40], [88], [16]. Because these
systems do not account for timing explicitly, as is the
case for our work, this approach will in nearly all cases
introduce an unnecessary performance penalty. The most
recent system by Zhang et al. [40] describes an approach
for mitigating side channels using a combination of security
types, hardware assistance, and predictive mitigation [89].
Unlike the type system in Section III, they do not guarantee
that information is not leaked through timing. Rather, they
show that the amount of this leakage is bounded by the
variation of the mitigation commands.
Ko¨pf and Basin [42] presented an information-theoretic
model for adaptive side-channel attacks that occur over
multiple runs of a program, and an automated analysis for
measuring the corresponding leakage. Because their analysis
is doubly-exponential in the number of steps taken by the
attacker, they describe an approximate version based on a
greedy heuristic. Mardziel et al. [90] later generalized this
model to probabilistic systems, secrets that change over
time, and wait-adaptive adversaries. Pasareanu et al. [91]
proposed a symbolic approach for the multi-run setting
based on MaxSAT and model counting. Doychev et al. [92]
and Ko¨pf et al. [41] consider cache side channels, and
present analyses that over-approximate leakage using model-
counting techniques. While these analyses are sometimes
able to derive useful bounds on the leakage produced by
binaries on real hardware, they do not incorporate security
labels to distinguish between different sources, and were not
applied to verifying constant-time behavior.
FlowTracker [14] and ct-verif [13] are both constant-time
analyses built on top of LLVM which reason about timing
and other side-channel behavior indirectly through control
and address-dependence on secret inputs. VirtualCert [15]
instruments CompCert with a constant-time analysis based
on similar reasoning about control and address-dependence.
These approaches are intended for code that has been
written in “constant-time style”, and thus impose effective
restrictions on the expressiveness of the programs that they
will work on. Because our approach reasons about resources
explicitly, it imposes no a priori restrictions on program
expressiveness.
Information flow: A long line of prior work looks at
preventing undesired information flows using type systems.
Sabelfeld and Myers [93] present an excellent overview
of much of the early work in this area. The work most
closely related to our security type system is FlowCaml [32],
which provides a type system that enforces noninterference
for a core of ML with references, exceptions, and let-
polymorphism. The portion of our type system that applies
to traditional noninterference coincides with the rules used
in FlowCaml. However, the rules in our type system are not
only designed to track flows of information, but they are
also used to incorporate the information flow and resource
usage behavior such as the rules SR:L-IF and SR:L-LET.
Moreover, our type system constructs a flexible interface
between FlowCaml and the resource type system, which
means the rules can be easily adapted to integrate into any
information-flow type system.
The primary difference between our work and the prior
work on information-flow type systems is best summarized
in terms of our attacker model. Whereas prior work assumes
an attacker that can manipulate low-security inputs and
observe low-security outputs, our type system enhances this
attacker by granting the ability to observe the program’s final
resource consumption. This broadens the relevant class of
attacks to include resource side channels, which we prevent
by extending a traditional information flow type system
with explicit reasoning about the resource behavior of the
program.
VIII. DISCUSSION
The definition of resource-aware noninterference given in
Definition 2 assumes an adversary whose observations of
resource consumption match the cost semantics with respect
to the cost model given in Section IV. Depending on how
the costs are parameterized, this may not match the actual
resource use in a physical environment on modern hardware.
Architectural features such as caching and variable-duration
instructions need to be accounted for in the cost semantics,
or the guarantees might not hold in practice [94], [7], [95].
Moreover, additional artifacts of the compilation process
can affect the constant-resource guarantees established by
the type system. Certain optimization passes and garbage
collectors might affect timing properties in ways that lead
to vulnerabilities if not accounted for by the cost semantics.
The cost semantics used in this work is conceptually
straightforward, and corresponds to the resource model en-
capsulated by the high-level programming language. Accord-
ingly, our verifier is oblivious to the machine instructions and
operand values that are eventually executed after the high-
level code is compiled. In particular, the fact that our cost
model effectively counts the total number of language primi-
tives that are executed, and not the corresponding processor
instructions with caching and other micro-architectural ef-
fects accounted for, means that compiled programs may not
satisfy resource-aware noninterference in practice despite
being provable within our type system.
Although architectural timing channels are nominally in-
visible at the source-language level, it may be possible
to incorporate these aspects into the cost semantics with
specific assumptions about the target platform and compiler
toolchain. Doing so with a high degree of precision is chal-
lenging, as the semantics may need to track extensive state
to accurately reflect the timing behavior of the underlying
platform. Another approach is to incorporate dependence
on these features indirectly, as in Zhang et al. [40] where
security labels are associated with hardware states to track
information flow dependencies throughout the hardware en-
vironment. This approach is compatible with our resource-
aware noninterference type system, but is less flexible for the
programmer as it is subject to the same types of imprecision
present in information-flow type systems. We leave as future
work developing more precise models that remain faithful to
the resource-consumption subtleties of hardware platforms.
Another limitation of this work follows from the impreci-
sion of the information-flow type system that is integrated
with our constant-resource type system to verify resource-
aware noninterference. It is well-known that such type
systems are more conservative than the semantics of allowed
noninterference [24], [25], [26], and this applies to our work
as well. In particular, a variable conservatively identified
as high-security could influence resource usage, leading
our verifier to conclude that a program which is constant-
resource in practice is not. Our approach mitigates this issue
since imprecise information-flow tracking does not directly
lead to rejections of secure programs but only increases
the burden on constant-resource analysis. Another potential
mitigation that applies in some cases is to simply prove
that the program is constant-resource with respect to all
variables. Another approach that we leave to future work is
to incorporate declassification mechanisms into our system.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have introduced new sub-structural type systems for
automatically deriving lower bounds and proving constant
resource usage. The evaluation with the implementation
in RAML shows that the technique extends beyond the
core language that we study in this paper and works for
realistic example programs. We have shown how the new
type systems can interact with information-flow type systems
to prove resource-aware noninterference. Moreover, the type
system for constant resource can be used to automatically
remove side-channel vulnerabilities from programs.
There are many interesting connections between security
and (automatic) quantitative resource analysis that we plan
to study in the future. Two concrete projects that we already
started are the integration of the type systems for upper
and lower bounds with information-flow type systems to
precisely quantify the resource-based information leakage
at certain security levels. Another direction is to more
precisely characterize the amount of information that can be
obtained about secrets by making one particular resource-
usage observation.
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APPENDIX
THE LANGUAGE SEMANTICS
The equivalent expressions in OCaml syntax of the lan-
guage are given as follows.
e ::= () | true | false | n | x
| x1 ⋄ x2
| f(x)
| let x = e1 in e2
| if x then et else ef
| (x1, x2)
| match x with (x1, x2) → e
| []
| x1 :: x2
| match x with | []→ e1 | x1 :: x2 → e2
| share x = (x1, x2) in e
⋄ ∈ {+,−, ∗, div , mod ,=, <>,>,<,<=, >=, and , or }
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 represent the typing rules for values,
the base typing and the evaluation rules for the language,
respectively.
TYPING RULES AND PROOFS OF LEMMA 2, LEMMA 3,
AND THEOREM 1
Typing rules
The full typing rules of the resource-aware security type
system are presented in Fig. 14.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is done by induction on the structure of the
typing derivation.
SR:UNIT: There is no variable thus it follows imme-
diately.
SR:BOOL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:INT: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:VAR: Since Γs(x) = S, if S ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x) ◭
k1.
SR:B-OP: If (bool, kx1 ⊔ kx2) ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x1) =
(bool, kx1) ◭ k1 and Γ
s(x2) = (bool, kx2) ◭ k1.
SR:IB-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:I-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:GEN - SR:C-GEN: By induction for e in the
premise, it follows.
SR:FUN: Because e is well-formed program, there
exists a well-typed expression ef such that pc’; Σ
s; Γs ⊢
ef : S2. By induction for ef , for all variables x in e, if
S ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x) ◭ k1. It is similar for SR:L-ARG and
SR:C-FUN.
S:LET: If S2 ◭ k1 then by induction for e2, S1 ◭ k1.
Thus for all variable x in e, it is a variable in e1 or e2. By
induction for e1 and e2, it follows. It is similar for SR:L-
LET.
SR:IF: If S ◭ k1 then by the hypothesis (bool, kx) ◭
k1. For all variable y in e, it is a variable in et or ef . By
induction for et and ef , it follows. It is similar for SR:L-IF.
SR:PAIR: If S1 ∗S2 ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x1) = S1 ◭ k1 and
Γs(x2) = S2 ◭ k1.
SR:MATCH-P: If S ◭ k1 then by induction for e,
Γs(x1) ◭ k1 and Γ
s(x2) ◭ k1. Thus Γ
s(x) ◭ k1. For all
other variables y in e, again by induction for e, if S ◭ k1
then Γs(y) ◭ k1. It is similar for SR:C-MATCH-P.
SR:NIL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:CONS: If (L(S), kx) ◭ k1 then Γ
s(xh) = S ◭ k1
and Γs(xt) = (L(S), kx) ◭ k1.
SR:MATCH-L: If S1 ◭ k1 then by induction for e2,
Γs(xh) = S ◭ k1 and Γ
s(xt) = (L(S), kx) ◭ k1. Thus
Γs(x) ◭ k1. For all other variables y in e, y is a variable in
e1 or e2. Again by induction for e1 and e2, if S1 ◭ k1 then
Γs(y) ◭ k1.
SR:SUBTYPING: By the subtyping relation, if S′ ◭ k1
then S ◭ k1. Thus by induction for e in the premise, for all
variables x in e, if S ◭ k1 then Γ
s(x) ◭ k1. It is similar
for SR:C-SUBTYPING.
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is done by induction on the structure of the
evaluation derivation and the typing derivation.
SR:UNIT: Suppose the evaluation derivation of e ends
with an application of the rule E:UNIT, thus E1 ⊢ e ⇓ ()
and E2 ⊢ e ⇓ (). Hence, it follows.
SR:BOOL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:INT: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:VAR: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:VAR, thus E1(x) = v1 and
E2(x) = v2. The typing derivation ends with an application
of the rule SR:VAR, thus Γs(x) = S. If S ◭ k1, by the
hypothesis E1(x) = E2(x) since x ∈ dom(Ei), i = {1, 2}.
SR:B-OP: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:BIN, thus E1(x1) ⋄ E1(x2) =
v1 and E2(x1) ⋄ E2(x2) = v2. The typing derivation ends
with an application of the rules SR:B-OP or SR:GEN. We
have kx1 ⊳ S and kx2 ⊳ S. If S ◭ k1 then kx1 ⊑ k1 and
kx2 ⊑ k1. By the hypothesis, we have E1(x1) = E2(x1)
and E1(x2) = E2(x2), thus v1 = v2.
SR:IB-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:I-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:GEN-SR:C-GEN: By induction for e in the
premise, it follows that if S ◭ k1 then v1 = v2.
SR:FUN: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:FUN, thus Σ(g) = T1 → T2
and [yg 7→ Ei(x)] ⊢ eg ⇓ vi for i = {1, 2}. The typing
derivation ends with an application of the following rules.
• Case SR:FUN. Because e is well-formed program,
there exists a well-typed expression ef such that
pc’; Σs; Γs ⊢ ef : S2 and ef̂ = eg. By induction for ef ,
if S2 ◭ k1 then v1 = v2.
(V:UNIT)
v = ()
|= v : unit
(V:BOOL)
v ∈ { true , false }
|= v : bool
(V:INT)
v ∈ Z
|= v : int
(V:PAIR)
|= v1 : T1 |= v2 : T2
|= (v1, v2) : T1 ∗ T2
(V:NIL)
v = nil
|= v : L(T )
(V:LIST)
|= vi : T ∀i = 1, ..., n
|= [v1, ..., vn] : L(T )
(T:UNIT)
Σ; ∅ ⊢ () : unit
(T:BOOL)
b ∈ { true , false }
Σ; ∅ ⊢ b : bool
(T:INT)
n ∈ Z
Σ; ∅ ⊢ n : int
(T:VAR)
x ∈ dom(E)
Σ; x : T ⊢ x : T
(T:B-OP)
⋄ ∈ { and , or }
Σ; x1 : bool, x2 : bool ⊢ op⋄(x1, x2) : bool
(T:IB-OP)
⋄ ∈ {=, <>,>,<,<=,>=}
Σ; x1 : int, x2 : int ⊢ op⋄(x1, x2) : bool
(T:I-OP)
⋄ ∈ {+,−, ∗, div , mod }
Σ; x1 : int, x2 : int ⊢ op⋄(x1, x2) : int
(T:FUN)
Σ(g) = T1 → T2
Σ; x : T1 ⊢ app(g, x) : T2
(T:LET)
Σ; Γ1 ⊢ e1 : T1 Σ; Γ2, x : T1 ⊢ e2 : T2
Σ; Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ let(x, e1, x.e2) : T2
(T:IF)
Σ;Γ ⊢ et : T Σ;Γ ⊢ ef : T
Σ; Γ, x : bool ⊢ if(x, et, ef ) : T
(T:PAIR)
Σ;x1 : T1, x2 : T2 ⊢ pair(x1, x2) : T1 ∗ T2
(T:MATCH-P)
Σ; Γ, x1 : T1, x2 : T2 ⊢ e : T
Σ;Γ, x : T1 ∗ T2 ⊢ match(x, (x1, x2).e) : T
(T:NIL)
T ∈ T
Σ; ∅ ⊢ nil : L(T )
(T:CONS)
Σ;xh : T, xt : L(T ) ⊢ cons(xh, xt) : L(T )
(T:MATCH-L)
Σ; Γ ⊢ e1 : T1 Σ;Γ, xh : T, xt : L(T ) ⊢ e2 : T1
Σ;Γ, x : L(T ) ⊢ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : T1
(T:SHARE)
Σ; Γ, x1 : T, x2 : T ⊢ e : T1
Σ; Γ, x : T ⊢ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : T1
(T:WEAKENING)
Σ;Γ ⊢ e : T1
Σ; Γ, x : T ⊢ e : T1
Figure 11. Typing rules for values and base types
• Case SR:L-ARG. It is similar to the case SR:FUN.
• Case SR:C-FUN. It is similar to the case SR:FUN.
• Case SR:GEN and SR:C-GEN. It follows.
S:LET: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:LET, thus Ei ⊢ e1 ⇓ vi1 and
Ei[x 7→ vi1] ⊢ e2 ⇓ vi for i = {1, 2}. The typing derivation
ends with an application of the following rules.
• Case SR:L-LET. If S2 ◭ k1, by the simple security
lemma, it holds that S1 ◭ k1. By induction for e1, we
have v11 = v
2
1 , so E1[x 7→ v
1
1 ] ≡k E2[x 7→ v
2
1 ]. Again
by induction for e2, we have v1 = v2.
• Case SR:LET. It is similar to the case SR:L-LET.
• Case SR:GEN and SR:C-GEN. It follows.
SR:IF: Suppose e is of the form if(x, et, ef ), the
evaluation derivation ends with an application of the rule
E:IF-TRUE or the rule E:IF-FALSE. The typing derivation
ends with an application of the following rules.
• Case SR:L-IF. By the hypothesis we have kx ⊑ k1,
thus E1(x) = E2(x). Assume that E1(x) = true , then
E1 ⊢ et ⇓ v1 and E2 ⊢ et ⇓ v2. By induction for et we
have v1 = v2 if S ◭ k1. It is similar for E1(x) = false .
• Case SR:IF. If kx ⊑ k1 the proof is similar to the
case SR:L-IF. Otherwise, kx 6⊑ k1, thus by the simple
security lemma we have S 6◭ k1.
• Case SR:GEN and SR:C-GEN. It follows.
SR:PAIR: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:PAIR, thus (Ei(x1), Ei(x2)) =
vi for i = {1, 2}. The typing derivation ends with an
application of the rules SR:PAIR or SR:GEN.
If S1 ∗ S2 ◭ k, then by the simple security lemma we
have S1 ◭ k1 and S2 ◭ k1. Hence it follows v1 = v2.
SR:MATCH-P: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends
with an application of the rule E:MATCH-P, thus Ei(x) =
(vi1, v
i
2) and Ei[x1 7→ v
i
1, x2 7→ v
i
2] ⊢ e ⇓ vi for
i = {1, 2}. The typing derivation ends with an application
of the following rules.
• Case SR:MATCH-P. If S ◭ k1, then by the simple se-
curity lemma we have S1 ∗S2 ◭ k1. By the hypothesis,
E1(x) = E2(x), thus v
1
1 = v
2
1 and v
1
2 = v
2
2 . Hence,
E1[x1 7→ v11 , x2 7→ v
1
2 ] ≡k E2[x1 7→ v
2
1 , x2 7→ v
2
2 ], by
induction for e in the premise, it holds that v1 = v2.
• Case SR:C-MATCH-P. It is similar to the case
SR:MATCH-P.
• Case SR:GEN and SR:C-GEN. It follows.
SR:NIL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:CONS: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:CONS, thus Ei(xh) = v
i
1 and
Ei(xt) = [v
i
2, · · · , v
i
n] for i = {1, 2}. The typing derivation
ends with an application of the rules SR:CONS or SR:GEN.
If (L(S), kx) ◭ k1 then by the hypothesis we have v
1
1 = v
2
1
and [v12 , · · · , v
1
n] = [v
2
2 , · · · , v
2
n]. Thus E1( cons (xh, xt)) =
E2( cons (xh, xt)).
SR:MATCH-L: Suppose e is of the form
match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2), the evaluation derivation ends
with an application of the rule E:MATCH-N or the rule
E:MATCH-L. The typing derivation ends with an application
of the following rules.
(E:UNIT)
E
q +K unit
q () ⇓ ()
(E:BOOL)
b ∈ { true , false }
E
q +K bool
q b ⇓ b
(E:INT)
n ∈ Z
E
q +K int
q n ⇓ n
(E:VAR)
x ∈ dom(E)
E
q +K var
q x ⇓ E(x)
(E:BIN)
v = E(x1) ⋄E(x2)
E
q +K op
q op⋄(x1, x2) ⇓ v
(E:FUN)
Σ(g) = T1 → T2 E[x
g 7→ E(x)]
q
q′ eg ⇓ v
E
q +K
app
q′ app(g, x) ⇓ v
(E:MATCH-N)
E(x) = nil E
q −K
matchN
q′ e1 ⇓ v
E
q
q′ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) ⇓ v
(E:NIL)
E
q +K nil
q nil ⇓ nil
(E:IF-TRUE)
E(x) = true E
q −K cond
q′ et ⇓ v
E
q
q′ if(x, et, ef ) ⇓ v
(E:IF-FALSE)
E(x) = false E
q −K cond
q′ ef ⇓ v
E
q
q′ if(x, et, ef ) ⇓ v
(E:PAIR)
x1, x2 ∈ dom(E) v = (E(x1), E(x2))
E
q +K
pair
q pair(x1, x2) ⇓ v
(E:MATCH-P)
E(x) = (v1, v2) E[x1 7→ v1, x2 7→ v2]
q −K
matchP
q′ e ⇓ v
E
q
q′ match(x, (x1, x2).e) ⇓ v
(E:CONS)
xh, xt ∈ dom(E) E(xh) = v1 E(xt) = [v2, .., vn]
E
q +K
cons
q cons(xh, xt) ⇓ [v1, ..., vn]
(E:LET)
E
q −K let
q′
1
e1 ⇓ v1 E[x 7→ v1]
q′
1
q′ e2 ⇓ v
E
q
q′ let(x, e1, x.e2) ⇓ v
(E:SHARE)
E(x) = v1 E[x1 7→ v1, x2 7→ v1] \ {x}
q
q′ e ⇓ v
E
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) ⇓ v
(E:MATCH-L)
E(x) = [v1, ..., vn] E[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]]
q −K matchL
q′ e2 ⇓ v
E
q
q′ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) ⇓ v
Figure 12. Evaluation typing rules
k ⊑ k′ T ∈ {unit, int, bool}
k ⊳ (T, k′)
k ⊑ k′ k ⊳ S
k ⊳ (L(S), k′)
k ⊳ S1 k ⊳ S2
k ⊳ S1 ∗ S2
k
′ ⊑ k T ∈ {unit, int, bool}
(T, k′) ◭ k
k
′ ⊑ k S ◭ k
(L(S), k′) ◭ k
S1 ◭ k S2 ◭ k
S1 ∗ S2 ◭ k
k ⊑ k′ T∈{unit, int, bool}
(T, k) ≤ (T, k′)
k ⊑ k′ S ≤ S′
(L(S), k)≤(L(S′), k′)
S1 ≤ S
′
1 S2 ≤ S
′
2
S1 ∗ S2 ≤ S
′
1 ∗ S
′
2
Figure 13. Guards, collecting, and subtyping relations
• Case SR:MATCH-L. If S1 ◭ k1, then by the simple
security lemma we have (L(S), kx) ◭ k1. By the
hypothesis we have E1(x) = E2(x). Assume that
E1(x) = E2(x) = [v1, · · · , vn], by the rule E:MATCH-
L we have Ei[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]] ⊢ e2 ⇓ vi for
i = {1, 2}. Since E1[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]] ≡k
E2[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]], by induction for e2,
it holds that v1 = v2 if S1 ◭ k1. It is similar for
E1(x) = E2(x) = nil .
• Case SR:C-MATCH-L.It is similar to the case
SR:MATCH-L.
• Case SR:GEN and SR:C-GEN. It follows.
SR:SUBTYPING: Suppose the typing derivation ends
with the rule SR:SUBTYPING. If S′ ◭ k1 then S ◭ k1. Thus
by induction for e in the premise it follows. It is similar for
SR:C-SUBTYPING.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is done by induction on the structure of the
typing derivation and the evaluation derivation. Let X be
the set of variables [Γs] 6◭k1 . For all environments E1, E2
such that E1 ≈X E2 and E1 ≡k1 E2, if E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1
(SR:UNIT)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
() : (unit, pc)
(SR:BOOL)
b ∈ { true , false }
pc; Σs; Γs
const
b : (bool, pc)
(SR:INT)
n ∈ Z
pc; Σs; Γs
const
n : (int, pc)
(SR:VAR)
x : S ∈ Γs pc ⊳ S
pc; Σs; Γs
const
x : S
(SR:B-OP)
x1 : (bool, kx1) ∈ Γ
s
x2 : (bool, kx2) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊑ kx1 ⊔ kx2 ⋄ ∈ { and , or }
pc; Σs; Γs
const
op
⋄
(x1, x2) : (bool, kx1 ⊔ kx2)
(SR:C-GEN)
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S constX(e)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S
(SR:GEN)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S
(SR:IB-OP)
x1 : (int, kx1) ∈ Γ
s
x2 : (int, kx2) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊑ kx1 ⊔ kx2 ⋄ ∈ {=, <>,>,<,<=, >=}
pc; Σs; Γs
const
op
⋄
(x1, x2) : (bool, kx1 ⊔ kx2)
(SR:PAIR)
x1 : S1 ∈ Γ
s
x2 : S2 ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊳ S1 ∗ S2
pc; Σs; Γs
const
pair(x1, x2) : S1 ∗ S2
(SR:I-OP)
x1 : (int, kx1) ∈ Γ
s
x2 : (int, kx2) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊑ kx1 ⊔ kx2 ⋄ ∈ {+,−, ∗, div , mod }
pc; Σs; Γs
const
op
⋄
(x1, x2) : (int, kx1 ⊔ kx2)
(SR:CONS)
xh : S ∈ Γ
s
xt : (L(S), kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊳ (L(S), kx)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
cons(xh, xt) : (L(S), kx)
(SR:SUBTYPING)
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S S ≤ S′
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e : S′
(SR:FUN)
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s Σs(f) = S1
pc′
−→ S2 pc ⊑ pc
′
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ app(f, x) : S2
(SR:L-ARG)
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s Σs(f) = S1
pc′
−→ S2 pc ⊑ pc
′
S1 ◭ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
app(f, x) : S2
(SR:C-FUN)
x : S1 ∈ Γ
s Σs(f) = S1
pc′/const
−−−−−→ S2 pc ⊑ pc
′
pc; Σs; Γs
const
app(f, x) : S2
(SR:NIL)
S ∈ S pc ⊳ S
pc; Σs; Γs
const
nil : (L(S), pc)
(SR:C-SUBTYPING)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S S ≤ S′
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e : S′
(SR:LET)
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ e1 : S1 pc; Σ
s; Γs, x : S1 ⊢ e2 : S2
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ let(x, e1, x.e2) : S2
(SR:L-LET)
pc; Σs; Γs
const
e1 : S1 pc; Σ
s; Γs, x : S1
const
e2 : S2 S1 ◭ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
let(x, e1, x.e2) : S2
(SR:IF)
x : (bool, kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs ⊢ et : S pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs ⊢ ef : S pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ if(x, et, ef ) : S
(SR:L-IF)
x : (bool, kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
et : S pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
ef : S pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S kx ⊑ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
if(x, et, ef ) : S
(SR:MATCH-P)
x : S1 ∗ S2 ∈ Γ
s
pc; Σs; Γs, x1 : S1, x2 : S2 ⊢ e : S
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ match(x, (x1, x2).e) : S
(SR:C-MATCH-P)
x : S1 ∗ S2 ∈ Γ
s
pc; Σs; Γs, x1 : S1, x2 : S2
const
e : S
pc; Σs; Γs
const
match(x, (x1, x2).e) : S
(SR:MATCH-L)
x : (L(S), kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs ⊢ e1 : S1 pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs, xh : S, xt : (L(S), kx) ⊢ e2 : S1 pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S1
pc; Σs; Γs ⊢ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : S1
(SR:C-MATCH-L)
x : (L(S), kx) ∈ Γ
s
pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs
const
e1 : S1 pc ⊔ kx; Σ
s; Γs, xh : S, xt : (L(S), kx)
const
e2 : S1 pc ⊔ kx ⊳ S1 kx ⊑ k1
pc; Σs; Γs
const
match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : S1
Figure 14. Typing rules for resource-aware security type system
and E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2. We then show that p1 − p
′
1 = p2 −
p′2 and v1 = v2 if S ◭ k1. By Lemma 3, e satisfies the
noninterference property at security label k1. Thus we need
to prove that p1 − p
′
1 = p2 − p
′
2.
SR:UNIT: Suppose the evaluation derivation of e ends
with an application of the rule E:UNIT, thus p1 − p′1 =
p2 − p′2 = K
unit .
SR:BOOL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:INT: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:VAR: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:B-OP: Suppose the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:BIN, thus E1
p′
1
+K op
p′
1
e ⇓ v1
and E1
p′
2
+K op
p′
2
e ⇓ v1. We have p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2 =
K op .
SR:IB-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:I-OP: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:C-GEN: By the hypothesis we have constX(e),
thus it holds that Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A and . (A | A,A). By
the constant-resource theorem, for all p1, p
′
1, p2, p
′
2 ∈ Q
+
0
such that E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1 and E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2, we have
p1 − p′1 = q + ΦE1(Γ
r) − (q′ + Φ(v1 : A)) and p2 − p′2 =
q + ΦE2(Γ
r)− (q′ +Φ(v2 : A)).
Since E1 ≈X E2, ΦE1(X) = ΦE2(X). For all y 6∈ X ,
E1(y) = E2(y) since E1 ≡k1 E2, thus Φ(E1(y)) =
Φ(E2(y)). Hence, ΦE1(Γ
r) = ΦE2(Γ
r), it follows p1−p′1 =
p2 − p′2.
SR:FUN: Suppose e is of the form app(f, x), thus the
typing derivation ends with an application of either the rule
SR:L-ARG, SR:C-FUN, or SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:L-ARG. By the hypothesis we have E1(x) =
E2(x), it follows p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2.
• Case SR:C-FUN. Because e is well-formed,
there exists a well-typed expression ef such that
pc’; Σs; Γs
const
ef : S2. By induction for ef
which is resource-aware noninterference w.r.t X ,
p1 −K app − p′1 = p2 −K
app − p′2, it follows.
• Case SR:C-GEN. By the case SR:C-GEN it follows.
SR:LET: Suppose e is of the form let(x, e1, x.e2), thus
the typing derivation ends with an application of either the
rule SR:L-LET or SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:L-LET. Suppose the evaluations
E1
p1 −K
let
p′ e1 ⇓ v
1
1 , E2
p2 −K
let
p” e1 ⇓ v
2
1 ,
E1[x 7→ v11 ]
p′
p′
1
e2 ⇓ v1, and E2[x 7→
v21 ]
p”
p′
2
e2 ⇓ v2. By induction for e1 that
is resource-aware noninterference w.r.t X ,
p1 −K let − p′ = p2 − K let − p”. By the hypothesis
v11 = v
2
1 . Thus E1[x 7→ v
1
1 ] ≈X E2[x 7→ v
2
1 ] and
E1[x 7→ v11 ] ≡k1 E2[x 7→ v
2
1 ], by induction for e2 that
is resource-aware noninterference w.r.t X , we have
p′ − p′1 = p”− p
′
2. Hence, p1 − p
′
1 = p2 − p
′
2.
• Case SR:C-GEN. By the case SR:C-GEN it follows.
SR:IF: Suppose e is of the form if(x, et, ef ), thus the
typing derivation ends with an application of either the rule
SR:L-IF or SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:L-IF. By the hypothesis we have E1(x) =
E2(x). Assume that E1(x) = E2(x) = true , by the
evaluation rule E:IF-TRUE, E1
p1 −K
cond
p′
1
et ⇓ v1
and E2
p2 −K
cond
p′
2
et ⇓ v2. By induction for et that
is resource-aware noninterference w.r.t X , we have
p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2. It is similar for E1(x) = E2(x) =
false .
• Case SR:C-GEN. Since E1 ≈X E2 w.r.t Γs, we have
E1 ≈X E2 w.r.t Γr. By the hypothesis we have
constX(e). Thus by the soundness theorem of constant
resource type system, it follows p1 − p
′
1 = p2 − p
′
2.
SR:PAIR: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:MATCH-P: Suppose e is of the form
match(x, (x1, x2).e), thus the typing derivation ends
with an application of either the rule SR:C-MATCH-P or
SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:C-MATCH-P. Let E′1 = E1[x1 7→ v
1
1 , x2 7→
v12 ] and E
′
2 = E2[x1 7→ v
2
1 , x2 7→ v
2
2 ]. If x ∈ X
then |E1(x)| ≈ |E2(x)|. Thus |E′1(x1)| ≈ |E
′
2(x1)| and
|E′1(x2)| ≈ |E
′
2(x2)|. Hence, E
′
1 ≈X∪{x1,x2} E
′
2, by
induction for e in the premise which is resource-aware
noninterference w.r.t X ∪ {x1, x2}, p1 − K matchP −
p′1 = p2 − K
matchP − p′2, it follows. If x 6∈ X then
E1(x) = E2(x), it is similar.
• Case SR:C-GEN. By the case SR:C-GEN it follows.
SR:NIL: It is similar to the case SR:UNIT.
SR:CONS: It is similar to the case SR:B-OP.
SR:MATCH-L: Suppose e is of the form
match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2), thus the typing derivation
ends with an application of either the rule SR:C-MATCH-L
or SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:C-MATCH-L. Let E′1 = E1[xh 7→ v
1
1 , xt 7→
v12 ] and E
′
2 = E2[xh 7→ v
2
1 , xt 7→ v
2
2 ]. If x ∈ X
then |E1(x)| ≈ |E2(x)|. Suppose E1(x) and E2(x)
are different from nil , |E′1(xh)| ≈ |E
′
2(xh)| and
|E′1(xt)| ≈ |E
′
2(xt)|. Hence, E
′
1 ≈X∪{xt,xh} E
′
2, by
induction for e2 which is resource-aware noninterfer-
ence w.r.t X ∪{xt, xh}, we have p1−K matchL −p′1 =
p2 − K
matchL − p′2, thus p1 − p
′
1 = p2 − p
′
2. If
E1(x) = E2(x) = nil then by induction for e1 that
is resource-aware noninterference w.r.t X , it follows. If
x 6∈ X then E1(x) = E2(x), it is similar.
• Case SR:C-GEN. By the case SR:C-GEN it follows.
SR:SUBTYPING: The typing derivation ends with an
application of either the rule SR:C-SHARE or SR:C-GEN.
• Case SR:C-SUBTYPING. By induction for e in the
premise, p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2.
• Case SR:C-GEN. By the case SR:C-GEN
TYPE SYSTEMS FOR LOWER BOUNDS AND CONSTANT
RESOURCE
The common syntax-directed typing rules for all of three
type systems; upper bounds, constant resource, and lower
bounds are represented in Fig. 15. While the different
structural rules are shown in Fig. 16, Fig. 17, and Fig. 18.
We can see that the relax rules are consistent among these
type systems in sense of satisfying the following.
(q ≥ p ∧ q − p ≤ q′ − p′) ∧ (q ≥ p ∧ q − p ≥ q′ − p′)
⇔ (q ≥ p ∧ q − p = q′ − p′)
That means the constraints for upper bounds and lower
bounds imply the constraints for constant resource and vice
versa.
The type systems for upper bounds, constant resource, and
lower bounds are affine, linear, and relevant sub-structural
type systems, respectively.
• Type system for upper bounds allows exchange and
weakening, but not contraction properties.
• Type system for constant resource allows exchange but
not weakening or contraction properties.
• Type system for lower bounds allows exchange and
contraction, but not weakening properties.
PROOFS OF LEMMA 4, THEOREM 2, THEOREM 3,
THEOREM 5, AND THEOREM 6
Proof of Lemma 4
The claim is proved by induction on the definitions of
potential and size-equivalence, in which |E1(x)| ≈ |E2(x)|
implies Φ(E1(x) : Γ
r(x)) = Φ(E2(x) : Γ
r(x)).
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is done by induction on the length of the deriva-
tion of the evaluation judgement and the typing judgement
with lexical order, in which the derivation of the evaluation
judgement takes priority over the typing derivation. We need
to do induction on the length of both evaluation and typing
derivations since on one hand, an induction of only typing
derivation would fail for the case of function application,
which increases the length of the typing derivation, while
the length of the evaluation derivation never increases. On
the other hand, if the rule C:WEAKENING is the final step in
the derivation, then the length of typing derivation decreases,
while the length of evaluation derivation is unchanged.
A:SHARE: Assume that the typing derivation ends
with an application of the rule A:SHARE, thus Σr; Γr, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B and .(A|A1, A2).
Let E1 = E \ {x} ∪ {[x1 7→ E(x), x2 7→ E(x)]}. Since
|= E : Γr, x : A and following the property of the share
relation we have |= E1 : Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2. By the
induction hypothesis for e, it holds that for all p, r ∈ Q+0
such that p = q+ΦE1(Γ
r, x1 : A1, x2 : A2)+r, there exists
p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying E1
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′+Φ(v : B)+r.
Because Φ(E(x) : A) = Φ(E1(x1) : A1) + Φ(E1(x2) :
A2) and ΦE(Γ
r) = ΦE1(Γ
r) = ΦE\{x}(Γ
r), thus p =
q + ΦE(Γ
r, x : A) + r and there exists p′ satisfying
E
p
p′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) ⇓ v.
C:WEAKENING: Suppose that the typing derivation
ends with an application of the rule C:WEAKENING. Thus
we have Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B, in which the data type A satisfies
.(A | A,A).
Since |= E : Γr, x : A, it follows |= E : Γr. By the
induction hypothesis for e, it holds that for all p, r ∈ Q+0
such that p = q+ΦE(Γ
r)+r, there exists p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying
E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′ + Φ(v : B) + r. By the property
of the share relation, Φ(a : A) = 0, then we have p = q +
ΦE(Γ
r, x : A)+ r, E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′+Φ(v : B)+ r
as required.
C:RELAX: Suppose that the typing derivation ends
with an application of the rule C:RELAX, thus we have
Σr; Γr
q1
q′
1
e : A, q ≥ q1, and q − q1 = q′ − q′1.
For all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = q + ΦE(Γ
r) + r =
q1 + ΦE(Γ
r) + (q − q1) + r, we have |= E : Γr. By the
induction hypothesis for e in the premise, there exists p′ ∈
Q+0 satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′1 +Φ(v : A) + (q −
q1) + r = q
′ +Φ(v : A) + r.
A:VAR: Assume that e is a variable x. If Σr;x :
A
K var
0 x : A. Thus for all p, r ∈ Q
+
0 such that p =
K var + Φ(v : A) + r, there exists p′ = Φ(v : A) + r
satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v.
A:UNIT: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:BOOL: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:INT: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:B-OP: Assume that e is an expression of the form
op⋄(x1, x2), where ⋄ = { and , or }. Thus Σ
r;x1 : bool, x2 :
bool
K op
0 e : bool and |= E : {x1 : bool, x2 : bool}.
We have E
K op
0 e ⇓ v, thus for all p, r ∈ Q
+
0 such that
p = K op + r = K op + ΦE(x1 : bool, x2 : bool) + r, there
exists p′ = Φ(v : bool) + r = r satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v.
A:I-OP: It is similar to the case A:B-OP.
A:IB-OP: It is similar to the case A:B-OP.
A:CONS: If e is of the form cons(x1, x2), then the type
derivation ends with an application of the rule A:CONS and
the evaluation ends with the application of the rule E:CONS.
Thus Σr;x1 : A, x2 : L
p1(A)
p1 +K
cons
0 e : L
p1(A) and
|= E : {x1 : A, x2 : L
p1(A)}.
We have E
K cons
0 e ⇓ [v1, ..., vn], where E(x1) = v1
and E(x2) = [v2, · · · , vn]. Let Γr = xh : A, xt : Lp1(A),
for all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = p1 +K
cons +ΦE(Γ
r) + r,
there exists p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying p
′ = Φ([v1, ..., vn] :
Lp1(A)) + r = ΦE(Γ
r)+ p1 + r and E
p
p′ e ⇓ [v1, ..., vn].
A:PAIR: It is similar to the case A:CONS.
A:NIL: It is similar to the case A:CONS.
A:MATCH-P: Suppose that the typing derivation
Σr; Γr, x : A1 ∗ A2
q
q′ match(x, (x1, x2).e) : A ends with
(A:UNIT)
Σr; ∅
K unit
0 () : unit
(A:B-OP)
⋄ ∈ { and , or }
Σr; x1 : bool, x2 : bool
K op
0 op⋄(x1, x2) : bool
(A:IB-OP)
⋄ ∈ {=, <>,>,<,<=,>=}
Σr;x1 : int, x2 : int
K op
0 op⋄(x1, x2) : bool
(A:INT)
n ∈ Z
Σr; ∅
K
int
0 n : int
(A:I-OP)
⋄ ∈ {+,−, ∗, div , mod }
Σr; x1 : int, x2 : int
K
op
0 op⋄(x1, x2) : int
(A:FUN)
Σr(f) = A1
q/q′
−−−→ A2
Σr;x : A1
q +K
app
q′ app(f, x) : A2
(A:LET)
Σr; Γr1
q −K
let
q′
1
e1 : A1 Σ
r; Γr2, x : A1
q
′
1
q′ e2 : A2
Σr; Γr1,Γ
r
2
q
q′ let(x, e1, x.e2) : A2
(A:IF)
Σr; Γr
q −K cond
q′ et : A Σ
r; Γr
q −K cond
q′ ef : A
Σr; Γr, x : bool
q
q′ if(x, et, ef ) : A
(A:PAIR)
Σr ;x1 : A1, x2 : A2
K
pair
0 pair(x1, x2) : A1 ∗A2
(A:MATCH-P)
Σr; Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2
q −K
matchP
q′ e : A
Σr ; Γr, x : A1 ∗ A2
q
q′ match(x, (x1, x2).e) : A
(A:BOOL)
b ∈ { true , false }
Σr; ∅
K bool
0 b : bool
(A:VAR)
Σr;x : A
K var
0 x : A
(A:NIL)
A ∈ A
Σr; ∅
K
nil
0 nil : L
p(A)
(A:CONS)
Σr ;xh : A,xt : L
p(A)
p +K cons
0 cons(xh, xt) : L
p(A)
(A:MATCH-L)
Σr; Γr
q −K
matchN
q′ e1 : A1 Σ
r; Γr, xh : A, xt : L
p(A)
q + p −K
matchL
q′ e2 : A1
Σr; Γr, x : Lp(A)
q
q′ match(x, e1, (xh, xt).e2) : A1
(A:SHARE)
Σr; Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B
.(A | A1, A2)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : B
Figure 15. Common syntax-directed typing rules for upper bounds, constant, and lower bounds
(U:RELAX)
Σr; Γr
p
p′ e : A
q ≥ p q − p ≥ q′ − p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
(U:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
(U:SUBTYPE)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A B <: A
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B
(U:SUPERTYPE)
Σr; Γr, x : B
q
q′ e : C B <: A
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : C
Figure 16. Relax and structural typing rules for upper bounds
(C:RELAX)
Σr; Γr
p
p′ e : A q ≥ p q − p = q
′ − p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
(C:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B .(A | A,A)
Σr ; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
Figure 17. Relax and structural typing rules for constant-resource
an application of the rule A:MATCH-P. Thus Σr; Γr, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2
q −K matchP
q′ e : A and |= E : Γ
r, x : A1 ∗A2.
Let E1 = E[x1 7→ v1, x2 7→ v2] and Γr1 = Γ
r, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2. Since |= v1 : A1, |= v2 : A2, and
|= E : Γr it holds that |= E1 : Γr1. For all p, r ∈ Q
+
0
such that p = q + ΦE(Γ
r, x : A1 ∗ A2) + r, thus
p − K matchP = q − K matchP + ΦE1(Γ
r
1) + r, by the
induction hypothesis for e, there exists p′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying
p′ = q′ + Φ(v : A) + r and E1
p−K matchP
p′ e ⇓ v. Hence,
by the rule E:MATCH-P, there exists p′ = q′+Φ(v : A)+ r
satisfying E
p
p′ match(x, (x1, x2).e) ⇓ v.
A:FUN: Assume that e is a function application of
the form app(f, x). Thus Σr;x : A1
q +K app
q′ e : A2 and
Σr(f) = A1
q/q′
−−→ A2. Because the considering program is
well-formed, there exists a well-typed expression ef under
the typing context Γr1 = y
f̂ : A1 and the signature Σ
r, or
(L:RELAX)
Σr ; Γr
p
p′ e : A q ≥ p q − p ≤ q
′ − p′
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A
(L:WEAKENING)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B .(A | A,A)
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B
(L:SUBTYPE)
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A A <: B
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B
(L:SUPERTYPE)
Σr; Γr, x : B
q
q′ e : C A <: B
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : C
(L:CONTRACTION)
Σr; Γr, x1 : A, x2 : A
q
q′ e : B
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ share(x, (x1, x2).e) : B
Figure 18. Relax and structural typing rules for lower bounds
Σr; Γr1
q
q′ ef : A2.
Let Γr = x : A1, E(x) = v1 and E1 = [y
f̂ 7→ v1], since
|= E : Γr, it follows that |= E1 : Γr1. For all p, r ∈ Q
+
0
such that p = q + K app + ΦE(Γ
r) + r, since ΦE1(Γ
r
1) =
Φ(E1(y
f̂ ) : A1) = ΦE(Γ
r) = Φ(E(x) : A1), it holds that
p−K app = q+ΦE1(Γ
r
1)+r. By the induction hypothesis for
ef , there exists p
′ ∈ Q+0 satisfying p
′ = q′ +Φ(v : A2) + r
and E1
p1
p′
1
ef̂ ⇓ v. Hence, E
p
p′ e ⇓ v.
A:IF: Suppose that e is an expression of the form
if(x, et, ef ). Then one of the rules E:IF-TRUE and E:IF-
FALSE has been applied in the evaluation derivation depend-
ing on the value of x.
Assume that the variable x is assigned the value true in
E, or E(x) = true . The typing rule for e has been derived
by an application of the rule A:IF using the premise on the
left thus Σr; Γr
q −K cond
q′ et : A.
Let Γr1 = Γ
r, x : bool, since |= E : Γr1, it follows that
|= E : Γr. For all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = q+ΦE(Γ
r
1) + r,
since ΦE(Γ
r) = ΦE(Γ
r
1) thus p1 = p − K
cond = q −
K cond + ΦE(Γ
r) + r. By the induction hypothesis for et,
there exists p′1 ∈ Q
+
0 satisfying E
p1
p′
1
et ⇓ v and p
′
1 =
q′ + Φ(v : A). Hence, by the rule E:IF-TRUE, there exists
p′ = p′1 satisfying E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′ + Φ(v : A). If
x is assigned the value false in E then it is similar to the
case E(x) = true .
A:MATCH-L: It is the same as the case of a conditional
expression. The evaluation derivation applies one of the rules
E:MATCH-N and E:MATCH-L depending on the value of
x.
Assume that x is assigned the value [v1, ...., vn] under
E, or E(x) = [v1, ..., vn]. Then, the evaluation derivation
ends with an application of the rule E:MATCH-L. Let E1 =
E[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]] and Γ
r
1 = Γ
r, xh : A, xt :
Lp1(A), the typing derivation ends with an application of
the rule A:MATCH-L, thus Σr; Γr1
q + p1 −K
matchL
q′ e2 : A1.
Since |= [v1, ..., vn] : Lp1(A), we have |= vi : A, ∀i =
1, ..., n. Hence, it holds that |= v1 : A and |= [v2, ..., vn] :
Lp1(A). Finally, we have |= E1 : Γr1 (since |= E : Γ
r
implies |= E1 : Γr).
For all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = q + ΦE(Γ
r, x :
Lp1(A)) + r, because ΦE(Γ
r, x : Lp1(A)) = ΦE(Γ
r) +
n.p1 + Σ
n
i=1Φ(vi : A), ΦE1(Γ
r
1) = ΦE1(Γ
r) + (n −
1).p1 + Σ
n
i=1Φ(vi : A) and ΦE1(Γ
r) = ΦE(Γ
r), thus
we have ΦE1(Γ
r
1) = ΦE(Γ
r, x : Lp1(A)) − p1. Thus
p2 = p − K
matchL = q + p1 − K
matchL + ΦE1(Γ
r
1) + r.
By the induction hypothesis for e2, there exists p
′
2 ∈ Q
+
0
satisfying E1
p2
p′
2
e2 ⇓ v and p′2 = q
′ + Φ(v : A1). Hence,
there exists p′ = p′2 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v. If E(x) = nil
then it is similar to the case A:MATCH-P.
A:LET: Assume that e is an expression of the form
let(x, e1, x.e2). Hence, the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:LET. Let E1 = E[x 7→ v1] and
Γr = Γr1,Γ
r
2. The typing derivation ends with an application
of the rule A:LET, thus Σr; Γr1
q −K let
q′
1
e1 : A1 and
Σr; Γr2, x : A1
q′
1
q′ e2 : A2.
For all p, r ∈ Q+0 such that p = q + ΦE(Γ
r) + r, thus
p1 = p−K
let = q −K let +ΦE(Γ
r
1) + ΦE(Γ
r
2) + r. Since
|= E : Γr, we have |= E : Γr1. By the induction hypothesis
for e1, there exists p
′
1 ∈ Q
+
0 satisfying E
p1
p′
1
e1 ⇓ v1 and
p′1 = q
′
1 +Φ(v1 : A1) + ΦE(Γ
r
2) + r.
We have |= E : Γr2, thus |= E1 : Γ
r
2, x : A1. Again by the
induction hypothesis for e2, with p2 = p−K let−(p1−p′1) =
p′1 = q
′
1 + ΦE1(Γ
r
2, x : A1) + r, there exists p
′
2 ∈ Q
+
0
satisfying E1
p2
p′
2
e2 ⇓ v and p′2 = q
′ + Φ(v : A2) + r.
Hence, by the rule E:LET, there exists p′ = p′2 satisfying
E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ = q′ +Φ(v : A2).
Proof of Theorem 3
First, we prove that if E
p
p′ e ⇓ v then p − p
′ = q +
ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′+Φ(v : A)). Suppose p− p′ 6= q+ΦE(Γr)−
(q′ +Φ(v : A)), there exists always some r1, r2 ∈ Q
+
0 such
that p + r1 = q + ΦE(Γ
r) + r2. Since E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, we
have E
p+ r1
p′ + r1 e ⇓ v. By Theorem 2, p
′+ r1 = q
′+Φ(v :
A) + r2, thus the assumption is contradictory.
Consider any E1 and E2 such that E1 ≈X E2, hence
E1 ⊢ e ⇓ v1 and E2 ⊢ e ⇓ v2. For all p1, p′1 ∈ Q
+
0 such
that E1
p1
p′
1
e ⇓ v1, we have p1 − p′1 = q + ΦE1(Γ
r) −
(q′ + Φ(v1 : A)). Similarly, for all p2, p
′
2 ∈ Q
+
0 such that
E2
p2
p′
2
e ⇓ v2, p2 − p′2 = q +ΦE2(Γ
r)− (q′ +Φ(v2 : A)).
Since ΦE1(X) = ΦE2(X) by Lemma 4, ∀x ∈ dom(Γ
r) \
X.Φ(Ei(x) : Γ
r(x)) = 0, and Φ(vi : A) = 0, i = 1, 2. Thus
p1 − p′1 = p2 − p
′
2.
Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is relied on Theorem 6. For all p, r ∈ Q+0 such
that p < q + ΦE(Γ
r) + r, assume that there exists some
p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and p
′ ≥ q′+Φ(v : A) + r.
Thus we have p−p′ < q+ΦE(Γr)−(q′+Φ(v : A)). On the
other hand, it holds that q+ΦE(Γ
r)−(q′+Φ(v : A)) ≤ p−p′.
The assumption is contradictory.
Proof of Theorem 6
The proof is done by induction on the length of the
derivation of the evaluation judgement E
p
p′ e ⇓ v and
the typing judgement Σ;Γ
q
q′ e : A with lexical order,
in which the derivation of the evaluation judgement takes
priority over the typing derivation. We need to do induction
on the length of both evaluation and typing derivations since
on one hand, an induction of only typing derivation would
fail for the case of function application, which increases
the length of the typing derivation, while the length of the
evaluation derivation never increases. On the other hand, if
the rules L:WEAKENING and A:SHARE are final step in the
derivation, then the length of typing derivation decreases,
while the length of evaluation derivation is unchanged.
A:SHARE: Assume that the typing derivation ends
with an application of the rule A:SHARE, thus Σr; Γr, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2
q
q′ e : B and . (A|A1, A2). Let E1 =
E\{x}∪{[x1 7→ E(x), x2 7→ E(x)]}. Since |= E : Γr, x : A
and following the property of the share relation we have
|= E1 : Γr, x1 : A1, x2 : A2.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ share(x, (x1, x2).e ⇓
v, by the rule E:SHARE we have E1
p
p′ e ⇓ v. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis for e in the premise, it holds that
q + ΦE1(Γ
r, x1 : A1, x2 : A2)− (q
′ +Φ(v : B)) ≤ p− p′.
Because Φ(E(x) : A) = Φ(E1(x1) : A1) + Φ(E1(x2) :
A2) and ΦE(Γ
r) = ΦE1(Γ
r) = ΦE\{x}(Γ
r), we have q +
ΦE(Γ
r, x : A)− (q′ +Φ(v : B)) ≤ p− p′.
L:WEAKENING: Suppose that the typing derivation
Σr; Γr, x : A
q
q′ e : B ends with an application of the rule
L:WEAKENING. Thus we have Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : B, in which
the data type A satisfies .(A | A,A). Since |= E : Γr, x : A,
it follows that |= E : Γr.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, by the
induction hypothesis for e in the premise, it holds that
q + ΦE(Γ
r) − (q′ + Φ(v : B)) ≤ p − p′. By the property
of the share relation, Φ(a : A) = 0, hence we have
q + ΦE(Γ
r, x : A)− (q′ +Φ(v : B)) ≤ p− p′.
L:RELAX: Suppose that the typing derivation ends
with an application of the rule L:RELAX, thus we have
Σr; Γr
q1
q′
1
e : A, q ≥ q1, and q − q1 ≤ q′ − q′1.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, we have |= E :
Γr, hence by the induction hypothesis for e in the premise, it
holds that q1+ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′1+Φ(v : A)) ≤ p−p
′. We have
q+ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′+Φ(v : A)) = q1+ΦE(Γr)− (q′1 +Φ(v :
A))+((q−q1)−(q′−q′1)). Since q−q1 ≤ q
′−q′1, it holds that
q+ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′+Φ(v : A)) ≤ q1+ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′1 +Φ(v :
A)) ≤ p− p′.
A:VAR: Assume that e is a variable x. If Σr;x :
A
K var
0 x : A. Thus for all p, p
′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓
v, we have p = p′+K var , henceK var +Φ(E(x) : A)−Φ(v :
A) ≤ p− p′ = K var .
A:UNIT: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:BOOL: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:INT: It is similar to the case A:VAR.
A:B-OP: Assume that e is an expression of the form
op⋄(x1, x2), where ⋄ = { and , or }. Thus Σ
r;x1 : bool, x2 :
bool
K op
0 e : bool and |= E : {x1 : bool, x2 : bool}.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, we haveK
op +
ΦE(x1 : bool, x2 : bool) − Φ(v : bool) = K op ≤ p − p′ =
K op .
A:IB-OP: It is similar to the case A:B-OP.
A:I-OP: It is similar to the case A:B-OP.
A:CONS: If e is of the form cons(x1, x2), then the typ-
ing derivation ends with an application of the rule A:CONS
and the evaluation derivation ends with the application of the
rule E:CONS. Thus Σr;x1 : A, x2 : L
p1(A)
p1 +K
cons
0 e :
Lp1(A) and |= E : {x1 : A, x2 : Lp1(A)}.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, we have p −
p′ = K cons , E(x1) = v1 and E(x2) = [v2, · · · , vn]. Let
Γr = xh : A, xt : L
p1(A), it holds that p1 + K
cons +
ΦE(Γ
r)− (Φ([v1, ..., vn] : Lp1(A))) = K cons ≤ p− p′.
A:PAIR: It is similar to the case A:CONS.
A:NIL: It is similar to the case A:CONS.
A:MATCH-P: Suppose that the typing derivation
Σr; Γr, x : A1 ∗ A2
q
q′ match(x, (x1, x2).e) : A ends with
an application of the rule A:MATCH-P. Thus Σr; Γr, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2
q −K matchP
q′ e : A and |= E : Γ, x : A1 ∗A2.
Let E1 = E[x1 7→ v1, x2 7→ v2] and Γr1 = Γ
r, x1 :
A1, x2 : A2, since |= v1 : A1, |= v2 : A2, and |= E : Γ
r it
holds that |= E1 : Γr1.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, by the rule
E:MATCH-P we have E1
p−K matchP
p′ e ⇓ v. Hence, by the
induction hypothesis for e in the premise, it holds that q −
K matchP +ΦE1(Γ
r
1)− (q
′+Φ(v : A)) ≤ p−K matchP − p′.
Since ΦE(Γ
r, x : A1 ∗ A2) = ΦE1(Γ
r
1), it follows that
q + ΦE(Γ
r, x : A1 ∗A2)− (q′ +Φ(v : A)) ≤ p− p′.
A:FUN: Assume that e is a function application of
the form app(f, x). Thus Σr;x : A1
q +K app
q′ e : A2 and
Σr(f) = A1
q/q′
−−→ A2. Because the considering program is
well-formed, there exists a well-typed expression ef under
the typing context Γr1 = y
f̂ : A1 and the signature Σ
r, or
Σr; Γr1
q
q′ ef : A2.
Let Γr = x : A1, E(x) = v1 and E1 = [y
f̂ 7→ v1], since
|= E : Γr, it follows that |= E1 : Γr1. For all p, p
′ ∈ Q+0 such
that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, we have E1
p −K app
p′ ef̂ ⇓ v. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis for ef , it holds that q+ΦE1(Γ
r
1)−
(q′ +Φ(v : A2)) ≤ p−K app − p′.
Since ΦE1(Γ
r
1) = Φ(E1(y
f̂ ) : A1) = ΦE(Γ
r) =
Φ(E(x) : A1), it follows that q + K
app + Φ(E(x) :
A1)− (q′ +Φ(v : A2)) ≤ p− p′.
A:IF: Suppose that e is an expression of the form
if(x, et, ef ). Then one of the rules E:IF-TRUE and E:IF-
FALSE has been applied in the evaluation derivation depend-
ing on the value of x.
Assume that the variable x is assigned the value true in
E, or E(x) = true . The typing rule for e has been derived
by an application of the rule A:IF using the premise on the
left thus Σr; Γr
q −K cond
q′ et : A. Let Γ
r
1 = Γ
r, x : bool,
since |= E : Γr1, it follows that |= E : Γ
r.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, by the
rule E:IF-TRUE we have E
p −K cond
p′ et ⇓ v. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis for et, it holds that q − K cond +
ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′ +Φ(v : A)) ≤ p−K cond − p′.
Because ΦE(Γ
r) = ΦE(Γ
r
1), it follows q + ΦE(Γ
r
1) −
(q′ +Φ(v : A)) ≤ p− p′. If E(x) = false then the proof is
similar.
A:MATCH-L: It is the same as the case of a conditional
expression. The evaluation derivation applies one of the rules
E:MATCH-N and E:MATCH-L depending on the value of
x.
Assume that x is assigned the value [v1, ...., vn] under
E, or E(x) = [v1, ..., vn]. Then, the evaluation derivation
ends with an application of the rule E:MATCH-L. Let E1 =
E[xh 7→ v1, xt 7→ [v2, ..., vn]] and Γr1 = Γ
r, xh : A, xt :
Lp1(A), the typing derivation ends with an application of
the rule A:MATCH-L, thus Σr; Γr1
q + p1 −K
matchL
q′ e2 : A1.
Since |= [v1, ..., vn] : Lp1(A), we have |= vi : A, ∀i =
1, ..., n. Hence, it holds that |= v1 : A and |= [v2, ..., vn] :
Lp1(A). Finally, we have |= E1 : Γr1 (since |= E : Γ
r
implies |= E1 : Γr).
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, by the
rule E:MATCH-L we have E1
p−K matchL
p′ e2 ⇓ v. By the
induction hypothesis for e2, it holds that q+p1−K matchL +
ΦE1(Γ
r
1)− (q
′ +Φ(v : A1)) ≤ p−K matchL − p′.
Because ΦE(Γ
r, x : Lp(A)) = ΦE(Γ
r) + n.p1 +
Σni=1Φ(vi : A), ΦE1(Γ
r
1) = ΦE1(Γ
r) + (n − 1).p1 +
Σni=1Φ(vi : A) and ΦE1(Γ
r) = ΦE(Γ
r), thus we have
ΦE1(Γ
r
1) = ΦE(Γ
r, x : Lp1(A)) − p1. Therefore, q +
ΦE(Γ
r, x : Lp1(A)) − (q′ + Φ(v : A1)) ≤ p − p′. If
E(x) = nil then it is similar to the case A:MATCH-P.
A:LET: Assume that e is an expression of the form
let(x, e1, x.e2). Hence, the evaluation derivation ends with
an application of the rule E:LET. Let E1 = E[x 7→ v1] and
Γr = Γr1,Γ
r
2. The typing derivation ends with an application
of the rule A:LET, thus Σr; Γr1
q −K let
q′
1
e1 : A1 and
Σr; Γr2, x : A1
q′
1
q′ e2 : A2.
For all p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v, by the rule
E:LET we have E
p −K let
p′
1
e1 ⇓ v1 and E1
p′
1
p′ e2 ⇓ v.
Since |= E : Γr, we have |= E : Γr1. By the induction
hypothesis for e1, it holds that q −K let +ΦE(Γr1)− (q
′
1 +
Φ(v1 : A1)) ≤ p−K let − p′1.
We have |= E : Γr2, thus |= E1 : Γ
r
2, x : A1. Again by the
induction hypothesis for e2, we derive that q
′
1+ΦE1(Γ
r
2, x :
A1)− (q′ +Φ(v : A2)) ≤ p′1 − p
′.
Sum two in-equations above, it follows q + ΦE(Γ
r
1) −
Φ(v1 : A1) + ΦE1(Γ
r
2, x : A1) − (q
′ + Φ(v : A2)) = q +
ΦE(Γ
r
1,Γ
r
2)− (q
′ +Φ(v : A2)) ≤ p− p′.
L:SUBTYPE: Assume that the typing derivation
ends with an application of the rule L:SUBTYPE, thus
Σr; Γr
q
q′ e : A and A <: B.
By the induction hypothesis for e in the premise, for all
p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v it holds that q+ΦE(Γ
r)−
(q′ +Φ(v : A)) ≤ p− p′.
Because Φ(E(x) : A) ≤ Φ(E(x) : B) we have
q + ΦE(Γ
r)− (q′ +Φ(v : B)) ≤ p− p′.
L:SUPERTYPE: Assume that the typing derivation
ends with an application of the rule L:SUPERTYPE, thus
Σr; Γr, x : B
q
q′ e : C and A <: B. Since |= E : Γ
r, x : A
and following the property of the subtyping relation we have
|= E : Γr, x : B.
By the induction hypothesis for e in the premise, for all
p, p′ ∈ Q+0 such that E
p
p′ e ⇓ v it holds that q+ΦE(Γ
r, x :
B)− (q′ +Φ(v : C)) ≤ p− p′.
Because Φ(E(x) : A) ≤ Φ(E(x) : B) we have
q + ΦE(Γ
r, x : A)− (q′ +Φ(v : C)) ≤ p− p′.
